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A Soviet spy who landed in GULAG

20

A SOVIET WEEKLY OF WORLD AFFAIRS

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NO COMMENT

YULIA GUKOVA

A SOVIET WEEKLY
OF WORLD AFFAIRS

NEW TIMES

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

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

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From our mailbag

■ A native of Saigon, in 1989 I subscribed to your magazine. Since that time I have been able to quench my thirst for news from all parts of the world: my family has neither a TV set nor a radio and even electricity is a rarity in this new economic village.

In December 1989, one of my daughters finished school and, having failed to find a job, decided to go to the USSR under the "Programme of Labour Cooperation" against my will. Judging by M.Kalmykov's article "the Lunar Calendar in Moscow" (*NT* 45/89) the situation of our countrymen working in your country is unfavourable. But how could I bring up my daughter with two more children and a non-working wife to support? My meager monthly wage is 30,000 dong which equals the price of 60 kilos of rice. So, my daughter went off to Moscow to suffer from cold winter, economic crisis and ungracious treatment on the part of the local population. I have no one to blame for this except myself. Since the liberation of South Vietnam in 1975 I have not been able to earn enough to support my own family. Nevertheless I don't think that the Russians are bad – many of them are so kind: for example, the Russian language teacher of my daughter or Vladimir Burov – the author of the article "Our Rice is Tastier" (*NT* 35/90) who sympathizes with Vietnamese workers.

My family lives on a shoestring, but I do not expect any help from my daughter. She has just finished school and doesn't know her beans about contraband tricks. Her monthly wage in the USSR is only enough for living expenses – at least I hope so. I don't have acquaintances among the Vietnamese nomenklatura in Moscow, hence I ask you to help my daughter join a Russian language course. She works at factory No.2 near Orekhovo-Zuevo (her name is Nguen Ngok Minh Thang, her address: apt.19, 102-a Lenin Street, Orekhovo-Zuevo, 241606).

I extend to all *NT* staff my heartfelt gratitude and say to them goodbye: in October I wanted to renew my subscription of your magazine, but the titles *New Times* and "Sputnik" were crossed out.

The reason: these publications feature odious articles...

Nguen Ngok Zlao
Le Minh Suan, Vietnam

■ We communists, as well as the entire work collective of the M.Azizbekov Khimprom production amalgamation are indignant to the innermost of our hearts at another act aimed at the destabilization of the already tense situation in the Transcaucasian region. We have in mind the publication in issue No.52/90 of a photograph of victims of the January 1990 tragic events that had been featured almost by the entire central press and had been released by the *Azerinform* republican news agency. The unfortunate people whom you can see on the photograph are victims of the troops that were brought into Baku, not of "Armenian pogroms" as it is said in the caption.

We agree with you that the use of the army is not the best way of settling interethnic conflicts, if it is a way at all. But

Seven KGB staff members for three hundred thousand people

■ The magazine *New Times* has published the declassified statistics of the former East German security sevice: one out of ten residents of the GDR turned out to be directly or indirectly associated with that service. It would be interesting to know, wrote the magazine, how many citizens in this country collaborate with the KGB.

A year ago I made a journalistic inquiry, requesting the Public Relations Center of the USSR Committee for State Security to provide me with some information about organizational and functional changes in the KGB after it became involved in the struggle against crime. My letter was forwarded to the local KGB from where I received a telephone call and an invitation to visit their office. I spent a few evenings talking to a staff member of the local office and drinking tea. I have learned a lot of interesting things there. The entire KGB office has seven permanent employees, two cars and a typewriter. I don't know how many secret helpers they have at enterprises in the city, but, considering that one employee can hardly supervise more than ten members of part-time staff, that figure would probably not top one hundred people. Having learned all this, all I had to do was sit down with pencil in hand and make some calculations: for three hundred thousand residents, seven full-time employees and a few dozen helpers. This is the entire KGB in a run-of-the mill provincial town. And the important thing to note here is that there are two secret munition plants in our town. If the esteemed *New Times* editors prefer to go by the East European proportions then in the city of Rybinsk there must be at least 60,000 KGB employees. Say this figure aloud and you will be taken for a lunatic!

I remember what the Moscow organization of the Democratic Union was like in 1988. Hardly a day passed that someone was not suspected of having connections with the KGB. In a matter of three months, I, for one, made a dazzling career from a captain to a colonel-general. Had I not got sick of all those dissident games of counter-intelligence I would have probably risen to the position of the KGB chairman.

They say, by the way, that the emigrant environment is still richer in the "KGB agents."

Literaturnaya Gazeta has even started to publish confessions of secret KGB part-time employees.

Once again we are witnessing division into "good guys" and "bad guys." In the past, every other man was assumed to be an "enemy of the people", today one man out of five is suspected of being an informer.

Andrei Novikov
Rybinsk, USSR

Since we have been liberated, we cannot maintain our families

It does not become us to run away from Germans

Diplomats of all countries: Jerusalem invites you

you should better think what could be a reaction to the publication (and with the wrong caption, to boot) of the photograph of the bodies of poor Azerbaijani sons and daughters who died in the prime of their lives.

An action like that plays into the hands of those who profit from the destabilization of situation and tension. We feel sorry for you, we feel sorry for the entire Azerbaijani people.

On behalf of the work collective,

F.Sadykhov,
general director
A.Bunyatov,
deputy secretary of the Party committee
V.Mamedov,
chairman of the trade union committee

THE WAY I SEE IT



Drawing by Sergei Khasabov

■ Please, help us! There are five children in our family. My husband, an officer with frontier troops, earns 430 rubles. I am a teacher, but I don't work now because my children often fall ill, and the eldest son suffers from tuberculosis.

Couldn't you publish the address of our family so that we could be given help? The children don't have warm clothes and footwear.

We live far away from Russia, and in Armenia they call us invaders. What foreign humanitarian aid they receive here they distribute only among their own people. Perhaps people from other republics and countries will help us? For them I give the information about the age of my children: Lesya is 17, Tanya 15, Oleg 14, Danil 13 and Inna 12. We shall be also very grateful for old clothes: the children have nothing to wear!

Galina Barteneva
military unit 2012,
Leninakan-21,
Armenia, 377521

Compiled by
Tatiana Chernova

A new home for the UN?

■ Both an experienced politician and a man who does not know much about international politics will agree today that the Middle East has become the hottest and the extremely highly explosive pocket on the planet for many years to come. When they begin to reject not only the norms of international law, but also the considerations of common sense, when the interests and destinies of peoples are not even considered to be a small factor in the irrational deadly roulette games of dictator-maniacs, the visionary powers of prophets and sometimes even the might of superpower become useless.

Nevertheless one has to react in one way or another, and it would be more sensible to think about the way out of a crisis not only after it crops up and one is facing a real threat, but also to adopt some preventive measures with due regard to the interests of the international community.

The new relations and possibilities call for the radical renewal of the UN role with the acquisition by it of new functions and powers necessary for effective prevention of new pockets of tension and the settlement of old conflicts.

It is clear that the role and place of the UN in the contemporary world should change, with its place, for that matter, changing not only in the figurative, but also in the direct sense of the word. The point is to ensure the most advisable from the view point of the contemporary geopolitical situation accommodation of the UN apparatus and forces. It would be logical if they were stationed not in the safe and prosperous North America, way off the most acute regional conflicts, but in the Middle East – the hub of the world tension that would hardly abate in the next few decades.

Needless to say that UN interest in stability in the Middle East will be nourished not only by some abstract humanistic considerations, but also by the real need for self-preservation. Then, for sure, we will also witness increased efforts to rule out the use of nuclear and chemical arsenals in that area as well as to find a counterbalance to the use of conventional arms and international terrorism.

The Soviet Union, too, has a tremendous stake in stability and in the elimination of military confrontation near its boders. China's influence in the region which is situated on the junction of Asia and Africa will be greater than on the American continent. There is no doubt, the life of the UN will get new impulses and experience qualitative transformations. This will represent an important step towards the realization of the idea of the UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar who thinks that the settlement of the Middle East crisis may have a historic importance, representing an important step along the way to the creation of a system of collective security of countries and peoples.

So, where should the future location of the UN be?

The author of this article is not an employee of foreign policy agencies, nor is he a parliamentarian or even a political scientist. Therefore I can venture to put forward the boldest of the ideas – even if it will be rejected by competent people who take decisions. I think that in the contemporary world suitable place for the UN is one of the cradles of civilization, the city of three religions – Jerusalem. All sides whose interests have become tragically intertwined in that long-suffering land will be able to see for themselves a chance to bring the situation out of the impasse, to lower the tension of confrontation, to ensure a greater protection of people under the "umbrella" of the UN that will be a guarantor of the observance of treaties on recognized and safe borders and the inner-state peaceful co-existence of peoples and the consensus of their interests.

In the light of the huge losses and costs sustained by many countries of the world in connection with the confrontation in Palestine, the Iran-Iraq war and the Iraqi agression against Kuwait, the relocation of the UN aimed at the prevention and mitigation of such crises in the future will not involve outlays beyond the means of the international community.

I realize that far from everyone will be happy about such changes. There will also be some fears that the UN might fall under the influence of the Zionist state. Other arguments, however, are also possible: the stationing of the UN in Jerusalem will limit Israel's sovereignty – after all this state has not always agreed to receive, even for a short time, international observers and experts. And yet, as the first step, why not discuss these proposals at least in the framework of citizen diplomacy?

Leonid Goldin,
Doctor of Sciences (Philosophy)
Moscow, USSR

POLITICAL LIFE

Yeltsin and the rest

Marina Shakina

A dozen people have decided to run for the presidency of Russia, but indications are that there will only be two serious contenders

The debate whether Russia needs a presidency is over. At the republican referendum, most citizens of Russia said an unambiguous "Yes." One by one the Soviet Union's republics elect their own presidents but Russia, one of the last republics with no president, will be the first to have its president elected by direct popular vote. The day of June 12 will see the first direct universal elections of the president of a sovereign Union republic.

A president possessing a direct popular mandate will be an irritating figure for the Supreme Soviet of Russia where political division is especially visible. But one more thing must be observed as well: of late the parliament of Russia has been finding itself in an impasse more and more often. Only a popularly elected president can overcome the impasse.

May 21 is the nomination deadline. So far, one can say that there are only two contenders on the list: Yeltsin and the rest.

Populism or popularity?

It so happens in this country that presidency is introduced right at the time when a new bright star appears on the political horizon. Today it is impossible to chase away the feeling that Yeltsin and Russian presidency are inseparably connected, or better still, custom-made for each other. When people say "the future president of Russia," they usually mean "Yeltsin." Perhaps partly because of this the idea of presidency in Russia had met with a stiff resistance – not everybody is happy about Yeltsin's presidential prospects.

When Yeltsin served as the Communist Party boss of Moscow, he was already labelled populist, in the Soviet interpretation something not really serious, a politician driven by the desire of personal popularity, not advocacy of a lofty political idea. With time, Yeltsin became a more experienced politician: people close to Yeltsin are unanimous when they mark his ability to learn. Another attractive feature of Boris Yeltsin is the absence of personal ambitions. Yeltsin is not afraid of cooperating with bright, talented people, he would always accept somebody else's competent advice. He can be resolute and independent in a crisis – as was shown during the events in Lithuania. The main thing, however, is that the people believe Yeltsin would never trade Russia's interests in behind-the-scenes political intrigues in exchange for personal benefit.



Boris Yeltsin: presidency may be only one step away from his extraordinary powers

So far, however, Yeltsin has only been "the

genius of confrontation." Yeltsin's popularity rating soared in comparison with Gorbachev, and very often popular support for Yeltsin has been only another kick to Gorbachev. So far, Yeltsin has been forgiven all mistakes and incautious utterings. The farther Yeltsin sails in this independent political voyage, the more room he gets for independent political decisions, the more troubles he will encounter. In the recent months different factions in Yeltsin's following have been disappointed with their idol's actions. He has already found staunch opponents in parliament – Communists and representatives of autonomous entities – whom he staggered by the sharp turn in his federal policy – from "take as much sovereignty as you can handle" to the refusal to recognize the autonomies' right to be sovereign subjects of the new Union Treaty. (Fortunately, the recent meeting of Gorbachev, Yeltsin and representatives of autonomies has produced a compromise.) The possible conflict with the autonomies may easily become the most formidable threat Yeltsin can face. After the massive walkout of coal miners, most coal mines were transferred under the authority of Russia, but will the Russian government be able to solve the branch's problems in a way that would satisfy the miners?

Nonetheless, as long as people love their leader, Yeltsin will be in the most favourable conditions for going down in history as the first president of Russia.



Nikolai Ryzhkov: will his reputation of a has-been ruin his campaign?

Second attempt

What about the rest? There are many of them. The liberal movement Demokraticheskaya Rossiya confined itself to nominating Yeltsin, so as not to split the vote of the pro-democratic citizens. As for the opposing camp, it seems hopelessly divided. A number of well-known politicians have consented to run – former premier Nikolai Ryzhkov, General Albert Makashov, Prof. Alexei Sergeyev. Others may still join.

As his recent speeches suggest, the charming Nikolai Ryzhkov is convinced that the country cannot do without him: the fact that he missed his chance to help the country when he headed the Council of Ministers does not seem to disturb him in the least. So far, nobody has reminded Ryzhkov that his government had buried the bumper crop, sent the inflation rate skyrocketing and produced three impotent economic recovery programmes. Now Nikolai Ryzhkov is going to put into practice the latest of those programmes, choosing it as the basis of a new anti-crisis plan.

Last autumn no meeting in this country failed to call for Ryzhkov's resignation. However, Ryzhkov did not succumb to the demands of "the mob." He never resigned, he was sacked for a different reason – it was time to reorganize the government and the Council of Ministers was abolished and replaced with the Cabinet of Ministers.

What are the views advocated by Ryzhkov as a possible leader of Russia? No private property on land, no hasty privatization of housing and factories, the spheres of competence of the Union and the republics must be divided after the signing of the Union Treaty. Ryzhkov counts on the support of the autonomies, factory collectives, kolkhozes and sovkhozes. Ryzhkov also awaited for a sanction from the Communist Party of Russia.

At their recent gathering, the leaders of the kolkhoz-sovkhoz agriculture have already voiced support for Ryzhkov. The hard-liners from the parliamentary faction Soyuz also said they were for Ryzhkov (although their chief concern must be the Union, not Russia). The Communists were also there with a word of approval.

Alexei Sergeyev was nominated by the United Front of the Working People (UFWP) and the second pilot congress of the Russian Communists. Sergeyev's following may be the same as Ryzhkov's – workers, kolkhoz peasants and factory white-collar staff. There is one striking difference, though. Sergeyev is a furious critic of Gorbachev, while Ryzhkov ranks among the President's loyal supporters.

Sergeyev is the brain of the UFWP, an umbrella organization uniting workers employed in the Soviet military-industrial sector. Sergeyev is a retired colonel, doctor of economics and professor of the Moscow State University. The main points of his economic programme are as follows: centralized planning based on "the strategic echelon of the economy" – the military-industrial complex, elections on the vote-where-you-work principle, restoration of National Economic Councils, progressive iheritance tax, and an original anti-inflation method – the lower is the price of produce, the higher is the pay of the producer.

Before he joined the presidential race, Sergeyev had been instructed by comrades from the Communist Initiative: "If you are elected president, see to it that there should be no presidency." The professor agreed to undermine the presidential power from within and those who visited the Gorky Park on May 9 could see the signature-collection campaign for Sergeyev under huge portraits of Stalin.

General Makashov has only spoken once – at the 28th Congress of the CPSU where he was admired by many. A furious antagonist of Gorbachev and the Soviet troops' pullout from Eastern Europe, Makashov has not been noted for any other actions, fortunately.

There is also Vadim Bakatin, member of the USSR Security Council. After he was fired as Interior Minister, Vadim Bakatin has not been visible on the political arena. His name is rarely mentioned in the press. The situation around the ouster of Bakatin, who was a career party man, is shrouded in secrecy, that is why a legend appeared connected with his name. It has been said that Gorbachev fired Bakatin for the latter's attempts to make law-enforcement bodies more democratic and sanctioning independence of the Baltic Interior Ministries. It must be noted that Bakatin is very popular in the Kirov Region where he had served as the first secretary of the regional party committee.

Although Bakatin seems to be the most attractive of the lot, he is still a dark-horse candidate.

The chairmen

The third group of candidates unites representatives of the exciting profession of

the chairman of a political party. Chairman of the Liberal Democratic Party Vladimir Zhirinovsky, Chairman of the Andrei Sakharov Union of Democratic Forces Vladimir Voronin and Chairman of the Conservative Party Lev Ubozhko are well-known figures on Moscow's political circuit. However, Demokraticheskaya Rossiya prefers not to do business with them.

The Moscow world of new political activism is exciting – a world of flowery and solemn names like The Centrist Bloc of Parties and Movements. The International Foundation for Support of Popular and Parliamentary Initiatives, etc. A world of breathtaking political scandals (during one of Zhirinovsky's foreign trips, his fellow members expelled him from the LDP, but he returned and restored the status quo by purging his opponents from the party). A world of exaggerated political ambitions. One *New Times* reader worked out the rules of his own one-man party with a very flowery name, and one paragraph of the rules specified the name of the founder – himself.

The name of Vladimir Zhirinovsky was mentioned in the national newsprogramme *Vremya* and on the next day appeared in all central newspapers shortly after the abolition of constitutional article 6 that sealed the Communists' monopoly on power. The timing was ideal: the Article was abolished and at the same time the Zhirinovsky party was at congress. The LDP programme is brief – one and a half typewritten pages, and the chairman himself expresses it in just two concepts: private property and a multiparty system.

The LDP does not distance itself from any political force, including the Communists. Its views on the future of the USSR cannot be described as a model of liberalism: Zhirinovsky advocates an intact USSR and does not approve of the liberties with new official languages.

Zhirinovsky can be seen at all meetings, congresses and conferences. He travels abroad a lot, regularly going to foreign countries to establish ties with like-minded parties. You can meet him at a foreign embassy reception too – at such receptions Zhirinovsky acts as the sole representative of all political forces alternative to the CPSU.

It remains unknown exactly how many people the Liberal Democratic Party unites. The Chairman claims a membership of 17,000, the Ministry of Justice's regulations require 5,000 signatures for registration of a new party (the LDP is officially registered and rumour has it that they presented 7,000 signatures). The LDP's rivals from among minor political parties argue that the LDP membership cannot be more that 1,000.

It is known, though, that the LDP is the leading party in what is called The Centrist Bloc of Parties and Movements, because the second most important member of that bloc – The Andrei Sakharov Union of Democratic Forces – has only a dozen members. Chairman of the Union Vladimir Voronin is Zhirinovsky's partner in the coalition and contender in the presidential race.

Both leaders enjoy "the most favoured status" among those in power. They are willingly received by Lukyanov, Ryzhkov, Kryuchkov, Moiseyev, Gromov. At one occassion, those obscure politicians were invited to discuss the idea of a coalition government. Zhirinovsky was already choosing a portfolio in that government.

"The president must be a strong and courageous person who can fight for his or her convictions. The President must also possess a number of other qualities. My party believes that I am such a person." These are the words of Lev Ubozhko, another Yeltsin's rival. What party does he chair? The Conservative (formerly Democratic) one.

Ubozhko withdrew from the radical Democratic Union because of unending frictions with its leader, Valeriya Novodvorskaya, and established the Democratic Party (earlier than Nikolai Travkin established a Democratic Party of his own). Travkin's Democratic Party was gaining more and more supporters, political weight and influence, pushing the Ubozhko party into the political curb. At the constituent congress, the Ubozhko party was re-named the Conservative Party, because no such party had been set up by that time. This event did not go without a scandal and confusion, because some party members disagreed with the renaming and the party leaders started excommunicating each other. In Moscow Lev Ubozhko is known as a professional party-maker.

Under Brezhnev Ubozhko had a chance to suffer – he spent several years in a labour camp for human rights activism. Like Zhirinovsky, Ubozhko loves to frequent all kinds of political gatherings.

To become a presidential candidate is a great chance to make one's name popular and to advertise oneself and the movement one represents. To be registered as a candidate, one must collect as many as 100,000 signatures. Naturally, not all politicians can collect as many signatures. This is not the main thing that matters, though. For example, the idea of protecting the rights of fringe sex groups, such as gays and lesbians, is not meeting with an overwhelming support in the country. But after the representative of the Sexual Minorities League, Chairman of the Libertarian Party Kalinin nominated himself for presidency, he can be sure that the whole country will soon know the problems of gays.

The second stage is even more difficult: at least one fifth of the deputies of the Congress of People's Deputies of Russia must vote for a candidate's name being included in the election ballot. Most probably after all trials, there will be two contenders left: Yeltsin and Ryzhkov. Although some people tend to grin at Ryzhkov's chances, the former premier feels quite confident. If all forces opposing Yeltsin rally around him, he may be as successful as Yeltsin at the elections. If things go right, Ryzhkov will be able to attract the vast rural areas and the autonomies; the only factor that spoils his game now is the stigma of a has-been.

Problems of presidents

Many Union republics have already elected presidents, not by a popular vote, though, but at parliamentary elections. The experience of the first universal election will give us moral gratification, but will it really change anything?

The emergence of a president in Russia will aggravate the relations between Russia and the centre, because the President of the USSR will have to do business with an almost equal President of the Russian Federation. Russia is the backbone of the USSR and is often equalled to the latter by some political scientists. Will the two presidents be able to coexist?

In the long-term prospect, the problem looks even more interesting. According to the Agreement of the Ten presidential elections must be held in the USSR within the first six months after the signing of the Union Treaty. By that time Russia will have elected its president, most probably Boris Yeltsin. If Yeltsin does not lose popularity by that time, the success of candidates for Union presidency will vastly depend on how Yeltsin and Russia will be disposed toward them. After all, Russia is the home of the most of this country's population. Besides, the political rivals are gradually mastering the art of political struggle – whom to nominate, whom to propose as vice-president, how to back one's "own" candidate in the best way, etc. – and chances are that we are in for an even more dramatic political spectacle. ■

Ruslan Khasbulatov:

The concept of strong power sounds ironic to me

Irina Lagunina of *New Times* speaks with the Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Republic

New Times. The Extraordinary Congress of People's Deputies of the Russian Republic ended with Boris Yeltsin's getting extraordinary powers. Has he used those powers somehow already?

Ruslan Khasbulatov. Yeltsin's were not extraordinary powers similar to those once given by the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR to President Gorbachev. By the way, that congress itself did not have the prerogatives it conferred on the President. Partly, the congress usurped the rights of Union republics, hoping that this might be a way to solve problems. Time has shown that that was a futile scheme. In our case, there was a moderate-scale redistribution of powers in favour of the Supreme Soviet. Naturally, the final say on all crucial matters still belongs to the Congress of People's Deputies of Russia. The congress delegated some powers to the Supreme Soviet and its Presidium and Chairman. And we have used those powers to the maximum.

NT. In what exactly sphere have you used your new powers?

R.Kh. We have adopted the whole package of laws concerning presidency in Russia, a series of legal acts on the presidential election procedure, and some decisions in the economic sphere. Boris Yeltsin himself has already used his new powers. One example is especially illustrative. The Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Republic was the only person who could stop the miners' strikes that were shaking the country. The situation was critical: the strikes could easily cripple all industry. As you probably remember, some speakers at the Extraordinary Congress asked Boris Yeltsin to address the striking miners, because the miners were not going to trust anyone else but Yeltsin. I thought then: will he really do that? After some time, he will have to pay the bills issued by miners. What was he going to pay with? After he got extended powers, the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet became able to provide new socio-economic prerequisites for a better life of the miners. He used the capabilites of the government and coordinated his actions with the Union structures – a special agreement was reached between the first deputy premiers of the Union and Russia on transferring the mines under the authority of Russia.

Armenia and Azerbaijan are burying their dead. Will Russia help restore peace?
Photo by Dmitry Borko

NT. What will this amount to in practice?

R.Kh. Many believe that the result will simply be the new centre and the new bosses. But in actual fact, we have worked out and started to create radically new types of enterprises – something like joint-stock companies oriented at the demands of the market, so that a considerable part of profits could be used for social needs, rural and urban development and the benefit of workers themselves. We are not creating one more bureaucratic structure. We are helping the formation of new free market relations in which workers and managers are interested themselves. We have not **quenched** the strikes, we have managed to convince people that strikes were **unprofitable** for them.

NT. What about the strikers' political demands?

R.Kh. I believe we have been able to convince them that the slogan of Gorbachev's resignation was not really appropriate at the moment. As for the demands for a round-table discussion and a coalition government of national trust, I believe these demands are reasonable and justified. We must assume the responsibility for meeting those demands and start cooperating with other Union republics so as to negotiate with the President and the central government, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR with the purpose of forming a government that people could trust.

I am deeply convinced that economy must be liberated from all kinds of pressure from the state and politicians as soon as possible. Economy must be governed by economic laws. Our business is to work out laws that would encourage free market relations, not cripple them.

NT. A new programme of promoting free market relations in Russia has recently been published. Can one Union republic have a free market economy, while other republics remain centralized economies? The neighbouring Byelorussia, for instance, is not going to change its approaches to economy.

R.Kh. I do not see any problems here.

How did the USSR managed to cooperate with free market economies before? I am not going to idealize our republican government, but it is making progress. I am sceptical about those who display caution today. What does caution mean? Balanced, well-calculated approaches, careful prognosticating are different from caution, and, yes, necessary.

The main points of the 500-Day Programme have been built in in the new economic recovery programme. Unfortunately we do not have any support outside and have to rely only on ourselves. By the way, last autumn I proposed to work out and start implementing an original economic recovery programme for Russia based on the main points of the Shatalin-Petrakov-Yavlinsky programme. I never believed the central authorities and the Ryzhkov government would ever accept the 500-Day Programme, although the President had pledged to have it adopted.

NT. If the republican economy becomes a free market economy and is withdrawn from the state influence, what will Yeltsin need his extraordinary powers for?

R.Kh. The concepts of "strong" and "weak" power sound ironic to me. A government must be efficient, must produce concrete results. Look at the President of the USSR. He has so many powers. So what? A government must be efficient, and to be efficient it must be horizontally and vertically rationalized. Recently, an interesting report from San Diego, California, was aired on Soviet TV. The city council of that city with a population of more than a million consists of only eight members. They can perfectly cope with all the responsibilities and challenges. Is their power strong or weak? In this country, the Moscow City Soviet consists of more deputies than the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Republic. And there are hundreds of deputies in regional, village and town Soviets. This is the kind of power that until recently had been backed by party committees. This system must be completely reorganized. It is not enough to introduce presidency. The basis of the pyramid of power will not change. Today many cities in Russia want to reduce the number of city Soviet membes, to make sessions less frequent and to introduce the office of a mayor. Why should we object?

NT. But the administrative and territorial division will have to be changed too.

R.Kh. We must gradually learn to accept the idea that it is necessary to reshape the country's division into districts. In the USSR, the district division used to serve the interests of the CPSU. The whole state was a state of various party committees.

NT. Do you think the Russian leadership may be accused of acting in an authoritarian manner?

R.Kh. Everybody's speaking about the advent of a dictatorship. In my opinion, speculations about dictatorship which were to be found in your magazine as well, have played a negative role. They helped justify the far-fetched theory of strong power and imminent dictatorship. The right wing made an extensive use of the idea. The attempts at a counterrevolutionary coup which we have seen were, in my opinion, generated by all kinds of pseudo-scientific speculations about the need of strong power and wrong assessments of the popular sentiments.

NT. I think you are exaggerating the role of the press in this country. No one has ever tried to scientifically analyze the necessity of the army involvement in ethnic conflicts, for instance. Nonetheless, the army was ordered to step in. What is your attitude to this role of the army?

R.Kh. Negative. It would be better if we did not use the army for the purposes that are alien to the army. The army's constitutional duty is to defend the country from external enemies. In ethnic conflicts, if the situation so commands, interior troops must be deployed. During the meeting between Boris Yeltsin and Zviad Gamsakhurdia, we suggested that the regular army units deployed in South Ossetia be replaced with interior troops. Unfortunately, that agreement remains unfulfilled for reasons beyond our control.

NT. What is your attitude to Russian citizens' taking part in actions against civilians?

R.Kh. The Russian Republic does not have an army. We agreed that we would not create an army. Last year the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Republic issued a decree banning the use of Russian citizens in ethnic conflicts.

NT. A delegation of the Supreme Soviet of Russia has recently visited Nagorno Karabakh. Why?

R.Kh. It was not the first time that a Russian parliamentary delegation visited the region. I believe that parliamentarians' desire to familiarize themselves with the situation there is completely understandable, especially now when according to the press, Armenian and Azerbaijani spokesmen, real fighting is going on there.

NT. The centre used to be equidistant from the conflict, but now it is taking a direct part in combat. What is Russia's position?

R.Kh. Two independent and sovereign republics are involved in the conflict and we are equally respectful towards both of them. We have called on the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan urging them to stop the violence. The conflict can be solved only by negotiations.

NT. Could Russia suggest a way out?

R.Kh. Evidently there must be a programme of gradual reduction of tensions. At the first stage combat could be suspended for a month. Another stage would be the withdrawal of militants from mutually agreed areas. At the third stage the sides would pledge to prevent new clashes and to refrain from the use of armed groups in settling disputes. Unfortunately, I do not see any such programme in the portfolio of the current administration. I believe also that a factor of tremendous psychological significance could be President Gorbachev's trip to the conflict region, meetings with the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan and a visit to Nagorno-Karabakh. I do not know why the President is so reluctant.

NT. As far as I understand the leadership of Russia fear that Transcaucasian conflicts may directly affect Russia.

R.Kh. The syndrome of armed struggle can spread into the Northern Caucasus as well. The situation there is potentially explosive. We have adopted a law on rehabilitation of peoples collectively repressed under Stalin, declared full respect for those peoples and their rights. The law will be implemented gradually and we will not permit seizure of disputed areas. Settling of complicated problems we have inherited requires much patience. We hope for understanding and respect for the law on the part of all ethnic communities.

NT. In other words, Russia can be eventually involved in the reconciliation process in the Caucasus?

R.Kh. Russia must participate in the settling of conflicts – Russia's historical role is too great, her role is the one of a stabilizing factor cementing all other republics. Logically, Russia itself must act as a united nation.

During the meeting of Boris Yeltsin, Mikhail Gorbachev, Anatoly Lukyanov and leaders of Russia's autonomous republics, all the participants were unanimous that an intergral Union was impossible without an integral Russia. They reached a common understanding that the republics of Russia are constituent parts of an integral Russian federative state. This approach was opposed only by the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Tatarstan who presented, in rather obscure terms, his own vision of Tatarstan's status. He said Tatarstan would sign the Union Treaty "separately." Frankly speaking, I did not really understand what he meant by that "separately." Other republics will also sign the treaty "separately," represented by their delegations making up the state delegation of the Russian Republic.

I believe that the meeting was very positive, the more so as the President of the USSR and the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR have for the first time demonstrated their determination to preserve the integrity of the Russian Republic.

Revising the victory

Lev Bezymensky

I had a lot of time to think about Soviet holidays when I waited in a bread line on May Day. The line was long and peaceful. Nobody swore at Premier Pavlov or discussed the new prices. A young man clad in Levis blue jeans waited patiently in front of me and beside me a nice old woman recalled how she used to join bread lines at night time during the war, but still survived...

Will we survive this time too? The hope for survival is the greatest secret of Soviet society, the most mysterious and self-friendly society the world has ever known. For Soviets holidays have always been something more than an occasion on which to have a nice dinner and a round of drinks. It is not true that people were herded to demonstrations – we used to come voluntarily and rejoiced at the chance to spend the holiday together. It was only after the war that someone invented the bureaucratic "demonstrations of representatives of the working people," while festive sittings became a rigid ritual not very different from the funeral.

> Victory Day must be a shared celebration

I cannot believe that today's society has nothing to say at demonstrations. The meetings in Manezh Square, the unsanctioned gathering of workers in Minsk's Lenin Square are convincing enough. It came as bitter disappointment for me, a communist since the war days, that my party refused to organize the May Day demonstration in Moscow, entrusting the trade unions to do the job.

Let us not, however, interpret this fact as a sign of changes in the Communist Party's relations with the working class. Simply, Moscow Party bosses scared by last year's May Day experience (when Gorbachev was catcalled from the Mausoleum) decided not to take risks. In other words, they silently admitted that they do not know the public sentiments and cannot rely on the masses. The thought gives me acute pain for my party which used to be a union of comrades and has degenerated into an association of likeminded persons. The slogan "down with..." ("... enemies of the people, capitalists, cooperators, etc.") can only make the population even more bitter.

The Victory Day offered more consolation, of course. However, it also had plenty of room for question marks. Especially after the announcement of the USSR Supreme Soviet declaration devoted to the Victory Day. It contained a lot of wise and right words, but one could not resist a feeling of doubt as one read a defensive slogan: let us defend the Victory Day! Defence is defence when there is an attacking enemy. Why artificially divide the country into friendly and hostile camps? At the same time the declaration failed to mention who was actually defeated in WW2. Today the Victory of 1945 cannot be reduced to the military-political act of unconditional surrender signed by Germany and Japan. Today the Victory symbolizes the historic defeat of ideas and material forces of aggression, racism, enmity and hatred by shared human values. The evil forces have not dissapeared, they have transformed and from time to time they make themselves known by filthy utterings, some of them can be easily found in the Soviet press too.

Let us be really serious about our holidays. Naturally, one can feel satisfied with the slow process of liberating our life from hollow incantations and meaningless celebrations. The mysterious Soviet rites like "socialist emulation," "socialist commitments," "presentation of a red banner of honour to most advanced workers," which were ununderstandable for the rest of the world have disappeared from our life, one by one. Nobody is taking freight cars and residential buildings under "socialist protection," no one proclaims oneself "a Communist shock worker," hurries to political indoctrination sessions or a class of party education. Have we lost anything? On the contrary, we have gained a little bit more self-respect.

Much will have to be done in this respect. Soviet "professional holidays," which are usually Sundays, remain squalid ceremonies. The always loyal newscasters of the national newsprogramme Vremya habitually say that although the chemists (or bakers, metal workers, salesmen, builders etc.) have had no successes in the past year, they still gather in that festively decorated hall. Isn't it time we stopped such indecent shows?

We must also reconsider the procedure of awarding medals and orders or conferring honorary titles. The country must know its heroes. But it would be better if colleagues and comrades of the future award-bearers nominated them for awards. Af for party apparatchiks and "leaders of the national economy," they should, I believe, voluntarily decline being awarded the Stars of the Hero of Socialist Labour. Socialist labour is their sacred duty and one does one's duty without asking for awards.

I would like to return to my idée fixe that holidays are not all we need. I have already suggested in *New Times* that the day of June 22, be declared the Day of Remembrance. The name suggested may have been not the happiest one. Readers suggested other names: the Day of Sorrow, the Day of Sorrow and Remembrance, the Day of Prayer for the Dead, the Day of Reconciliation. Others asked whether the introduction of such a day would perpetuate the hatred for Germans. My answer is that history cannot be rewritten and the day of June 22, 1941, cannot be crossed out from it. But who said the day was to divide peoples?

Konstantin Simonov's words "There is no such thing as somebody else's grief" remind the current generations that the great tragedy of the war can make us courageous enough to ponder together on life and death, on the necessity of historical reconciliation, including the final reconciliation of the peoples of Germany and the Soviet Union. Kohl and Mitterand shook hands in the field of Verdun. Why don't Gorbachev and Weizsäcker do the same in Brest, or in the defensive lines near Moscow, or somewhere on the Kursk Bulge? We need good omens. May they be with us.

The Baltics: time for some real negotiations

The unofficial international meeting "Human Rights, National Rights" will be held in the Hague in mid-May on the initiative of the De Burght Human Rights Conference and the Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation. The meeting will be attended by MPs and prominent scientists from a number of European countries – in particular, by Soviet, Russian and Baltic members of parliament and experts. At the meeting, certain laws passed by the Union, Russian and Baltic parliament will undergo an independent international examination for conformity to international and European human rights standards and to the documents of the Conference on Security and operation in Europe.

The West European public is closely following the development of disintegration processes in our country, as evidenced by the article below – a contribution form Jacob von Uexkull, the well-known German politician.

A Baltic German, Jakob von Uexkull was in 1974-1989 a member of the European Parliament's political committee, the Baltic Intergroup and the Delegation for promoting relations with the USSR.

Dzhanghir Atamali,
Executive Secretary of the Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation

Jakob von Uexkull

The preferred scenario of the Balts runs roughly as follows: the West threatens Moscow with sanctions unless the Baltic republics are given immediate independence. Moscow gives in and the Red Army together with many immigrants go back to Russia. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania quickly reach Scandinavian standards of living by making use of their "Hong Kong" position vis-à-vis the vast Soviet market.

But a very different scenario may be more realistic: The growing chaos in the USSR makes it impossible for the central government to block Baltic independence. This causes hardline "salvation committees" in Baltic areas with large Russian populations to declare their own independence – if Russia refuses to accept their accession. In the ensuing civil war Red Army units side with them and defeat the poorly armed Balts. Puppet dictators are installed in the newly "sovereign" republics. In Lithuania the mostly non-Lithuanian workers at the Ignalina nuclear power plant near the Byelorussian border renew their demand to be joined with Byelorussia – hoping to save their jobs, as many Lithuanians want to close down the plant. When their demand is refused, they strike and abandon the plant, thereby inadvertently causing an accident which makes large areas of the Baltics and neighbouring countries uninhabitable...

Will help come form abroad?

Baltic ministers are now regularly received at the highest levels in Western capitals with many good wishes and expressions of sympathy. Nobody is so impolite as to point out that, if they are overthrown tomorrow by Moscow or the local Red Army, there is nothing effective the West can or will do. Any economic sanctions will be short-lived as the Chinese students know only too well. The Finnish President has therefore repeatedly warned his Baltic colleagues not to rely on the West but to follow his country's example and deal directly with Moscow however difficult this may be.

The Baltic alliance with other anti-Moscow forces has been a serious mistake. It may be emotionally satisfying to celebrate solidarity with the Popular Fronts of Georgia, Armenia, etc., but this has weakened the position of those who have stressed the unique case of the Baltics as recognized independent states and members of the League of Nations. Many Balts seem to believe that if Moscow sees itself simultaneously faced with many different trouble spots, it will somehow forget about the Baltics and let them "sneak away." But Moscow now knows that whatever it gives Lithuania today, the Ukraine will demand tomorrow.

As a Green MEP two years ago I worked with conservative colleagues to block a resolution which linked the Baltic issue with the demands of other nationalities in the USSR. We felt that this point was important. If you insist that you do not belong to the USSR and want Moscow's interference in Baltic affairs to stop, then you should be careful not to interfere in Soviet affairs. It is easy to symphathize with the Baltic sentiment that they cannot "abandon" those who have supported their struggle. But this makes the Baltics hostage to the democratization and orderly disintegration of the whole of the USSR. Where does this solidarity end?

What NATO prefers

The Baltic record in the treatment of minorities has been very good. The same can hardly be said for some of the other republics. Does the "democratic struggles which the Balts cannot abandon" (to quote a highly-placed Baltic minister) just include Georgia's struggle against Moscow or also the Ossetians who fight in civil war "conditions as in Beirut" (*Der Spiegel*) to restore their autonomous region which Georgia has abolished?

There is much sympathy in the West for the peaceful Baltic struggle. But there is no support for the break-up of the USSR. If the Balts do value Western support they need to be aware that, if their case becomes linked to, for example, the emergence of new Muslim republics allied to Iran, then most Westerners will opt for the status quo. Even NATO will no doubt prefer a weak but intact USSR to the prospect of 15 or more warring republics, many ruled by military warlords and in possession of nuclear arms.

So what can be done?

While expressing understanding for the democratiic struggles in the USSR, the Baltic states should not provide or join anti-Soviet platforms or sign statements or make agreements which identify them with other anti-Soviet causes. This neutrality would not be selfish as a successful Baltic

The Vilnius TV and Radio Centre captured four months ago has not been yet returned to the lawful government of Lithuania

transition to independence will still set an example and thus be of much greater help to other group than impotent expressions of support.

The Baltic republics should request that the International Court of Justice be charged to examine the legality of their incorporation into the USSR. Recognizing that sovereignty is not a magic wand but the result of a process of national self-determination, they should negotiate with Moscow to expand the space for such self-determination in more and more areas.

Boomerang

For example, I was assured in Moscow by Deputy Foreign Minister Petrovski that the USSR would not object to the Baltic republics becoming members of the United Nations, as the Ukraine and Byelorussia have been for many years. While their membership has so far been a formality, such a step now would give the Baltic states new opportunities to enhance their sovereign status, including the right to call on the UN in times of crisis.

I am told the Baltic governments do not want to apply for UN membership until they are fully sovereign. This may be logical in theory but is counterproductive in reality. The Federal Republic of Germany only achieved full sovereignty in 1990 but has been a UN member for many years. Another problem appears to be that the USA has signalled its opposition to such an application as it does not want to give the USSR more votes... This shortsightedness should not deter Tallinn, Riga and Vilnius from trying. It can only be in their interest to show that their foreign policy is not determined by either superpower.

German unification may have given the impression that Moscow will concede almost anything if pressed. But this misses the point that Germany had somethng to offer which Moscow badly wants. Prominent Soviet representatives have stressed repeatedly that, in return for giving up the GDR, they expect to be led by the Germans into the magic Wirtschaftswunderland.

What can the Baltics offer Moscow? First of all, they need to follow the Finnish example of how to live happily next to a superpower. Moscow should be assured that the independent Baltic republics would not become hosts to the entire Soviet opposition.

Secondly, there is the question of the immigrants from other parts of the USSR who cannot be held responsible for the policies of Stalin or Brezhnev. All those who fulfil minimum residency requirements – i.e. not including soldiers temporarily garrisoned in the Baltics – should be offered the right of abode and to acquire full citizens' and minority rights. Any hesitation on this point – understandable in view of recent history and the demographic situation – would backfire.

Independence versus demilitarization

A crucial issue remains, in which the West has a major role to play. The USSR will expect some reciprocal compensation for the strategic loss of the Baltic republics. The details are a matter for negotiation. The demilitarizaton of the Baltic, for instance. It would be preferable if the Baltic foreign ministers themselves put forward some joint proposals which show that they recognize Moscow's security interests in this respect.

The alternative of trying to pressure the USSR by economic means to commit political suicide is dangerously naive. Such a policy can only strengthen the hand of the military hardliners for it is hardly likely that the Red Army will simply agree to break up the country it has sworn. Faced with the choice of continuing its withdrawal from Eastern Europe by withdrawing from the Baltic republics – or lose Western aid – the military command may well decide to do without "stop the chaos." They will not be without supporters and, as their Chinese colleagues will tell them, the West will not stay away for long...

The bloc-to-bloc parity originally envisaged in the European disarmament negotiations demanded very substantial and often onesided Soviet cuts, while ignoring NATO superiority in other fields. But the de facto collapse of the Warsaw pact has turned this "parity" into a massive NATO superiority – which will in all likelihood increase – as the forces of Poland, Hungary etc., continue to be counted on the Soviet side.

The Soviet CFE negotiators showed the strategic importance of their Baltic forces by agreeing to much deeper cuts, for example, in the Leningrad Military District than in the Baltic region. They will not abandon the Baltic states without a Western quid pro quo. Yet, although the West could – in view of the developments outlined above – well afford to be magnanimous in this respect without in any way endangering its own security, no Western official statement on the Baltics has even mentioned the issue. This fact reveals more about Western priorities than any kind words to visiting Baltic politicians. It is on this issue that the friends of the Baltic peoples now need to focus their attention.

Some citizens of Tiraspol boycotted the Union referendum by burning their ballot papers

Moldova: a year-old sovereignty

The parliament was expected to adopt a declaration of the republic's independence

A new session of the Moldavian parliament was opening in a complicated situation. The parliamentary struggle has reached a deadlock. The Gagauz and Dniester autonomies, not yet recognized by anyone, continue to exist. The national idea which has united Moldavians is being split.

Stalemate in parliament

The general election held in the republic last year did not bring victory to any of the two political forces which had a clear idea of state organization. The Popular Front, the main radical organization of the Moldavian national movement, won less than a third of the 380 seats in the parliament. Its backbone is formed by the Union of Humanitarians, part of the Moldavian intelligentsia and marginal urban sections (mainly people who recently moved from Moldavian villages to cities and small towns of Bessarabia with a predominantly Russian population). The Intersoyuz, which also won about a third of seats, is a broad coalition of movements representing mainly the Russian-speaking population of cities and rural areas – Ukrainians, Gagauzes, Bulgarians and Russians who want to preserve the USSR and resist the Moldavian national idea. The balance of forces was determined by the stand of centrist deputies, mainly heads of collective and state farms and district party functionaries. The deputies belonging to this group do not have a more or less clearly expressed ideology and political programme and are united by the desire to maintain the status quo.

The political initiative was taken by the Popular Front, which formed a "Moldavian bloc" and became its leader. The bloc is cemented not so much by political and ideological as by emotional factors, namely, by the maintenance of "national-liberation" passions at a high pitch and the creation of the illusion of "an irrepressible impulse" of the nation. The steady worsening of ethnic relations in the public has been an adverse effect of these processes since the new parliament started its work.

Who is considered a native?

Since their establishment in June 1990 the government and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet have pursued the policy of "Moldavianization" of the state apparatus, enterprises and institutions subordinate to republican authorities. Purges of "non-national" and disloyal elements and the wide-scale renaming of towns have become a usual thing.

Moldavia is not homogeneous in the ethnic, demographic, historic, political and cultural aspects. The central and northern parts of the area between the Dniester and Prut rivers (Bessarabia) belonged to the Moldavian state from the eighties of the 14th century to 1812, when it was joined to Russia. The Bessarabian villages have always had a predominantly Moldavian population, with the exception of six districts in the north where Unkrainians constitute 30 to 40 percent of the population. The area on the left bank of the Dniester never belonged to the Moldavian state and was included in the Moldavian republic in 1940 owing to the predominance of ethnic Moldavians there.

The southern areas of Bessarabia (Bujak, a large part of which was turned over to the Ukraine in 1940) were under the rule of the Crimean khan since the eighties of the 15th century, and Tartars roamed there in the past. These areas were populated mainly in the 19th century by people from the Ukraine, Balkan countries (Bulgarians and Gagauzes), Russia, Germany and the part of Moldavia west of the Prut river. Today the southern areas of Bujak belonging to the Moldavian republic have a mixed population, with zones of the compact residence of Gagauzes, Bulgarians and Ukrainians. The cities which have a mixed Slav-European-Moldavian and Armenian-Greco-Gypsy population continue to remain a special demographic factor. Is it possible to govern such an ethnically heterogeneous republic by relying exclusively on the "Moldavian bloc"?

"The super-goal"

The Moldavian community is also torn by serious political and cultural contradictions. Especially painful is the problem

of assessment of Romanian statehood.

The Romanian state was formed in 1859 by the merger of Moldova and Walachia, two Danube principalities. In the 19th and early 20th centuries the process of westernization of culture actively developed in Romania. However, it did not affect much Bessarabia and, the more so, the areas on the left bank of the Dniester, which belonged to the Russian empire. A number of cultural features distinguishing "Soviet" Moldavians from Romanians appeared in this way. The nationalist dictatorship established in Bessarabia after its forcible annexation to Romania in 1918 tended to consolidate among Moldavians the realization of their specific character and their negative attitude to the Romanian state. All this taken together as well as a realistic assessment of Moldavia's economic prospects in the event of its inclusion in Romania explain why most Moldavians did not accept the plan of reunification. According to various polls, only 3 to 10 percent of them favour such a plan. Romanophobia definitely prevails among the national minorities of the republic and among Moldavians living on the left bank of the Dniester. At the same time, pro-Romanian sentiments are widely spread among Moldavian intellectuals, especially those who are active in politics and play the leading role in the Popular Front.

Annexation ("reunification") is a sort of "unattainable ideal" for the Popular Front, the "super-goal" for which it can strive but which is dangerous to proclaim openly. A newspaper close to the Popular Front wrote in December 1990 "What can we do if most of our compatriots fear the word 'Romanian' and reunification with Romania?"

Three republics instead of one

The second congress of the Popular Front, held in the late June and early July of last year, declared that "the ultimate goal of the Front is reintegration of all Romanian territories east of the Prut into a single state – Romanian republic of Moldova." It also recommended that the word "Romanian" should be introduced everywhere instead of the word "Moldavian." A scandal broke out, and relatively moderate members of the Popular Front used the occasion to leave this organization.

This episode was the beginning or rather an omen of the crisis of power in the republic. The non-Moldavian population was in a state of prostration.

The Gagauz people were the first to act. On July 27, 1990 the Supreme Soviet of the republic adopted a decision on the Gagauz question. It granted the Gagauz people the status of "an ethnic group" instead of the territorial autonomy they enjoyed before. A week later the second congress of representatives of the Gagauz people, meeting in Komrat, adopted a declaration on the establishment of the Gagauz republic and its independence of the republic of Moldova." On September 6 a similar decision was passed by the second congress of deputies at all levels from the area on the left bank of the Dniester and from Bendery, a city on the right bank of the river. Elections to the Supreme Soviet of the Gagauz republic and the Supreme Soviet of the Dniester Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic were set for October 28 and November 25, respectively.

The subsequent events are well known: the formation of groups of Moldavian volunteers, a decree on the raising of republican guards, the institution of the post of President of Moldova with the right to declare a state of emergency, the "liberation march" of volunteers to the south, the entry of Interior Ministry troops into the area, and the Dubossary tragedy. Nevertheless, elections to the Supreme Soviets of the two republics took place and the division of Moldova became a fact, though the new state formations were not recognized by Moscow and other constituent republics. The bloodshed in the events became a serious hindrance to a rapprochement between the opposed political forces.

Controversy over referendum

Till recently the Moldavian leadership avoided making statements on withdrawal from the Union. It advanced the idea of transforming the USSR into "a commonwealth of sovereign states" without a single citizenship, territory, symbols and central administrative bodies.

However, when the fourth congress of people's deputies and then the Supreme Soviet of the USSR adopted a decision on holding a referendum to determine the future of the Union as a federation the time of decision also came for Moldova. After a long procrastination and discussion the Presidium of the Republic's Supreme Soviet approved a tough variant of the Popular Front. It refused to hold a Union referendum on March 17. Instead, the Presidium decided to conduct a republican poll on March 10 with the following question: "Do you think that Moldova should become and independent and sovereign state retaining and developing mutually advantageous ties with the constituent republics of the USSR and other states?" The Supreme Soviet, refusing to hold a Union referendum (183 out of the 365 deputies voted against it), did not adopt either a decision on conducting a poll (176 deputies voted for). It was in fact a serious setback for the Popular Front.

On March 5 the parliamentary crisis led to the transfer of all executive power to President Snegur, who was charged with forming a new government. Prime minister Druk, a key figure in the Popular Front, resigned.

Thus, on the eve of the referendum there appeared a more or less real hope for a serious weakening of the Front's positions and a stronger influence of moderate elements.

The loss of the image

The campaign against the March 17 referendum was waged on an unprecedented scale and had an avowedly repressive character.

The people of Kishinev bore the brunt of the anti-Union campaign. Some 109,000 went to the polls in the city – roughly half of the expected number. However, in other regions of the republic the referendum passed in a relatively quiet atmosphere. The majority of citizens in the Dniester, Gagauz, Taraklia and Bessarabian areas (Bujak) and in the cities of Kagul and Beltsy voted for the preservation of the Union.

The fragmentation of the republic, of its society and territorial space has obviously exceeded the critical level. This makes the adoption of more or less significant political decisions impossible. The situation is aggravated by the fact that far from all political forces of the replublic are really interested in the existence of Moldova as a state, both outside and within the USSR. There are serious reasons to believe therefore that the possibilities of overcoming the political crisis independently, by the republic's own forces – if they existed before in general – have now been exhausted.

Vladimir Bruter and Vladimir Solonar,
People's Deputy of Moldova

Photo from Time (USA)

KISHINEV

Are we better off uncivilized?

On decency in politics, as illustrated by an open letter published in *Sovetskaya Rossiya*

Naturally, I do not share the views of the Russian Federation's Communist Party leaders, and, frankly, have had no need to make this obvious fact public. Nevertheless, the open letter to Alexander Yakovlev entitled "The Architect in the Debris" by Gennady Zyuganov, a member of the Politbureau, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Russian Federation's Communist Party, published in the newspaper *Sovetskaya Rossiya,* appealed to me as a human-interest document. It is as such that the letter merits consideration, I think.

Alexander Yakovlev is averse to the apparat of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, and the latter is averse to him – this is only too logical and hardly needs any comment. So where is the snag? Ah, here it is. Let me quote a fragment of the letter for all its seeming insignificance: "I remember you (Alexander Yakovlev. – **K.Sh.)** patting a bulky file one day and saying: 'This is the draft programme for perestroika, and we are sure to turn this country upside down one day.' What jarred on me was the word 'this,' not 'our,' and besides, why turn our much-suffering country upside down at all?"

Let us leave aside the question, for all its importance, of why our country is a much-suffering one, and try to make clear the following. Your Party colleague, what's more, your boss, is having an honest-to-goodness talk with you, and you are trying to remember every word of it. A few years later, when the man is no longer your boss and when you are much higher on the social ladder, you reproduce the talk in a paper and garnish it with the comment that your former boss was wrong, and that you thought right, but kept mum for the time being.

It is downright mean to act that way, but not extraordinary for a certain class of individuals. In this context, however, one can see why Zyuganov disapproves of Yakovlev's call for returning to world civilization. After all, a man guilty of such an action would be simply cut dead in civilized society. So why should he try to join world civilization? Isn't it better to live by the rules established through the decades which a certain quarter of society sets for itself for its own convenience? Or without any rules at all?

In this sense, Zyuganov's text is frank and open – I'd say to the extent of lyrical vulnerability. Here, look at that: "Even fascism failed to get at loggerheads nations and generations, fathers and children, city dwellers and villagers..." It would have been more appropriate, perhaps, to make such a heart-felt confession in a place like the Piskaryovo Cemetery or, say, the Warsaw ghetto, but the pages of the *Sovetskaya Rossiya* paper are also a fitting place for it. If we are to go back to world civilization, we must take into account the fact that although this civilization sets great store by tolerance, it is absolutely intolerant of those condescending to fascism. This moral integrity is one of the great assets of the world civilized community Zyuganov is so averse to.

And now, lest anyone should accuse me of quoting anyone's words out of context, let me give you the quotation in full: "Even fascism failed to get at loggerheads nations and generations, fathers and children, city dwellers and villagers, and today this has become a tragical reality." So, fascism has failed – but who has succeeded in that? Who are worse than fascists? The frank author of the open letter holds something back here, hints at something and resorts to understatement. He gives us "food for thought," as it were. But the train of thought he triggers cannot but include memories of the brutalities committed against unarmed civilians in Riga and Vilnius, in Baku and Tbilisi – and correlate these tragical events with Zyuganov's reasonings and with his sympathizers' actions. Not all of those who had killed and who had stood behind their backs were named as yet. They will be, I hope. So far, all we know for sure is that those were "our men."

You see, one can be reluctant to abide by the generally accepted rules of the human community but know that to trespass them means to ruin his reputation. Zyuganov does not seem to know that, or, perhaps, relegates the very concept of reputation to the Western "flea market." It only remains to wish him to carry on successfully as the head of the Central Committee of the Russian Federation's Communist Party which, as it has turned out, "is rallying all to the aversion of a national calamity, and persistently seeking understanding with its political opponents..."



Drawing by Arkady Gursky

The level and character of this search is also shown in the open letter: "Isn't it amazing that an envoy of even a great foreign power invites, upon coming over to the Union, the leaders of our republics over the government's head, as if they were private individuals? This is a colonialist's way to behave towards semi-savage tribal chiefs upon showering them with gifts and plying them with drink." It is good that this has been written black on white. I think it would be useful for the leaders of the sovereign republics, the peoples of which are pondering over which centre suits them best, to know what Zyuganov – and, for that matter, the leader-

ship of the Russian Federation's Communist Party – thinks of them. Now it is crystal clear what the sovereign republics are to expect if the centre's policy towards them is pursued by people like the author of the open letter. All the more so since Zyuganov's thoughts about fascism fit in perfectly well with the imperial, colonialist concept.

He wonders why "all that hullabaloo was raised" and why a commission was set up "when at the Party congress minutes of your (A.Yakovlev's – **K.Sh.**) talk with young delegates changed hands." The simple answer to this question is that what "changed hands" was slanderous misinformation. Such an answer will hardly satisfy Zyuganov – it follows from the above that he is clearly at odds with plain human morality.

Want any more arguments to confirm this? Here you are. "'Mass media just mirror the reality, but do not form it.' This being so, the line of distinction between the truth and a lie is actually erased."

It follows from this fragment of the open letter that there are welcome facts of reality which, for that reason, correspond to the truth, and unwelcome facts which, accordingly, do not. Well, now everything falls into place. Mikhail Andreyevich Suslov could not have worded it any better.

As for criticism, no one is immune to it. One is free to criticize Yakovlev, Ryzhkov, Pavlov, Lukyanov and the President (I am enumerating those mentioned in the open letter) without violating the Law on the Press (this is *a propos* "baiting," "denigration"). Criticism is necessary: we have been deadlocked for decades by Zyuganov's ideological predecessors. People have lost all faith and got sick and tired. "Solid discontent and aggressiveness," to quote the author of the open letter, is certainly there. But one thing is obvious to me: despite the fierce resistance of the reactionary forces which smartly put to use people's base insincts and depraved passions, ever more people in this country are coming to realize that the documents like Zyuganov's open letter ought to be recoiled at rather than feared. The credit for this goes to Alexander Yakovlev.

"You (Yakovlev. – **K.Sh.**) have ostantatiously, for all Europe to see, put up Lenin's portrait, in an attempt to look a pale shadow of him." Sounds weird? Not to me. Who cares? In a friend's office, for instance, I saw a portrait of Lenin and right next to it, that of his mistress which was a bit smaller and hang a bit lower. If these portraits have changed places by now, I won't blame him, by God. The human right to the revaluation of values, just as the right to remain true to these values which were selected once and for all – this is also an inalienable property of world civilization and one of its indisputable achievements.

And here is another thing to end with. "Take a close look at the socio-political picture of Lithuania, Georgia, Armenia, Eastern Europe. One can see there, at May Day meetings, red flags and streamers saying: 'Communists, forgive us, you were right'."

Far be it from me to question the veracity of Zyuganov's observations, I'd like, nevertheless, to share with you my own. Recently, I re-visited Poland, a country I had lived and worked in for years, a country I am in love with. I happened to get there at the time when presidential elections were in progress. I saw no red flags and streamers of the kind Zyuganov writes about – neither over crowds, nor in the hands of private individuals. And this despite the fact that at that time the PUWP was headed by Wojciech Jaruzelski and Mieczyslaw Rakowski, whom I have profound respect for. Those were world-known statesmen who certainly compare favourably to the present leaders of the Russian Federation's Communist Party. Even those statesmen were not apologized to, or asked back. Why? Because, I think, they have reckoned too much with our leaders of those times the nostalgia for whom permeates Zyuganov's open letter from beginning to end.

Our author remarks that some will bear personal responsibility with good reason. Most of those who led us for decades to where we have landed now are no longer with us. Calling decrepit old men to account is not considered proper in the world civilization we, I hope, are bound for. But those who are going to take up the torch from these old men and from the ones who have passed away by now ought to bear moral responsibility for crimes the like of which have few parallels in the history of mankind.

Konstantin Shcherbakov

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EXCLUSIVE FOR NEW TIMES

There is no turning back

President of the Republic of Botswana Dr. **Quett Ketumile Joni Masire** answers questions from Alexander Pumpyansky, *New Times* Editor-in-Chief, and Nikolai Reshetnyak, *New Times* correspondent in Southern Africa

New Times. A year ago Namibia achieved independence. Real possibilities for settling the situations in Angola and Mozambique began to emerge. Far-reaching reforms aimed at creating a non-racial society are being carried out in South Africa, at the same time the nature of its relations with neighbouring countries has changed. In your opinion, could it be that the time has come to drop the use of such terminology as "Frontline States," "enemies," etc? Can we start using terms like "good-neighbourliness," "cooperation," "mutual understanding," when we talk of the interrelationship between Southern African states?

Q.K.J.Masire. The Frontline States Group (which is association of states in Southern Africa sharing borders with South Africa and other minority-ruled states) was formed in the 1970s to give support to the liberation movements in the region. It was given this mandate by the Organization of African Unity.

It should be noted that the minority white regimes in Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), Namibia and South Africa posed a serious threat to the independent states of the region and these states came together to combine their efforts so that the plight of the oppressed majorities in the three countries I have mentioned could be exposed to the international community. South Africa and Southern Rhodesia launched military raids against us and also sponsored rebel groups in the then newly-independent states of Angola and Mozambique to destabilize their governments.

Although Namibia gained independence, the political problems in the region are not yet over. South Africa has a long way to go before things can normalize. It continues aiding rebels in Mozambique and military raids against Botswana, Zambia and Zimbabwe. We can't, however, be sure that these unlawful acts will cease.

Against this background we feel that the Frontline States still need to excercise their right to self-defence.

Even though South Africa is slowly changing its apartheid policies, there is no need for us to be complacent since there has not been improvement in the lives of the black majority.



Quett Ketumile Joni Masire

Despite the fact that we have commended President de Klerk for his bold initiatives to introduce democratic reforms, we feel that it is too early to dismantle the Frontline States, because we still have a role to play in promoting negotiations and peaceful coexistence in the region.

I want to point out that there has never been a question of open hostilities and confrontation among the Frontline States towards South Africa. Our goals have been based on the principle of justice, peace and equality. We can only talk about mutual understanding and cooperation among the Southern African states once South Africa has become a non-racial and democratic and united country.

N.T. What is the attitude of Botswana towards lifting international economic sanctions and ending the boycott against South Africa?

Q.K.J.Masire. The Frontline States are incapable of imposing sanctions on South Africa because we do not have the capacity to do so. However, we have maintained that those countries that have the capacity to impose such sanctions should not use us as an excuse for their inaction. We have also associated ourselves with the decisions of international bodies such as the Commonwealth and the United Nations on ending apartheid. We believe that international pressures have been useful in prodding South Africa towards change. The Frontline States are of the opinion that pressures ought to be maintained until profound and irreversible change has taken hold in South Africa. Mr. de Klerk has introduced very significant changes but much work still remains before anyone can say apartheid was dead and buried.

N.T. Are you convinced by the assertions of South African leaders on the irreversibility of the reforms?

Q.K.J.Masire. I trust that the South African leaders mean well when they say that what you call reforms are irreversible. Going backwards would be disastrous for all of us.

N.T. How do you see the prospects of the Southern African region.

Q.K.J.Masire. In a nutshell, prospects for peace in Southern Africa are promising because of the political changes that are taking place. We have already started working towards the development of our region by pooling our resources together under the umbrella of the Southern African Development and Coordination Conference (SADCC). Our region is rich in re-

sources both natural and human. If change in South Africa should succeed, I foresee good prospects of economic and social progress for all our people.

N.T. Could you please provide some comment on the Soviet-Botswana relations.

Q.K.J.Masire. Relations between Botswana and the Soviet Union have improved significantly over the years. We have a common position on international issues like disarmament, the strengthening of the United Nations; self-determination for the colonized and oppressed people... The Gulf war is a case in point where we both agreed that Iraq should withdraw from Kuwait unconditionally.

The Soviet Union has been offering Botswana some assistance in many fields. We have Botswana who have studied in the Soviet Union and who are now taking part in the development of this country. There is cooperation between Botswana and the Soviet Union in the fields of mining and water development.

Looking at what has been going on between the two countries, one can say with confidence that cooperation between the two countries in the field of trade and technical experience will flourish with the passage of time.

At the moment, we do not have resident Embassy in Moscow due to manpower and financial constraints. We hope this is something that we shall remedy in the future.

The Republic of Botswana



The Republic of Botswana, former British protectorate Bechuanaland, is situated in the central part of Southern Africa and has common borders with Zambia, South Africa, Zimbabwe and Namibia. By the size of the territory Botswana is comparable to France. However, the population is small – about 1.3 million people most of whom belong to the ethnic group of Tswana. Most people are Christian, but local religions and cults, and Islam are also represented.

About 80 percent of Botswana's territory is occupied by the Kalahari Desert. The climate varies from continental to semi-desert. Very often Botswana is plagued by severe droughts. That is why the calls "Pula," meaning "rain" are an indispencable element of public speeches made by politicians, public and religious figures. Symbolically, the monetary unit of Botswana is also called "pula."

Even by African standards, Botswana is a young state. On September 30, 1991, the people of Botswana will celebrate their country's twenty-fifth anniversary.

The capital of Botswana is Gaborone, called so in the memory of one of the traditional Botswana chieftains who lived at the end of last century. Today Gaborone is the country's economic and socio-political centre.

In the relatively short period of time Botswana has made a significant progress. Diamond mining remains the basis of Botswana's economic development, because diamond exports revenues create the necessary conditions for socio-economic progress. Today Botswana ranks among the world's top diamond producers. However, diamonds are not Botswana's only riches; the country also has huge deposits of copper, nickel, calcinated soda, coal. Deposits of gold, silver and semi-precious stones have been recently found. Oil and gas prospecting is under way.

The country has over 2.5 million heads of cattle. The meat-packing industry is equipped with the latest technological innovations and meat products are one of the main export items. The traditionally favourable foreign trade balance has made it possible for Botswana to accumulate considerable hard-currency reserves.

The economic successes of Botswana are vastly defined by traditional political stability in the country. The successful functioning of a multiparty system is the result of political pluralism encouraged in Botswana.

Botswana is a presidential republic. The president of the country and the ruling Botswana Democratic Party, Quett Ketumile Joni Masire, was born in 1925 in the town of Kanye, southern Botswana. After he had been trained as a teacher in Botswana and South Africa, Masire taught in the school he had founded and later worked as a journalist. As a deputy, he participated in the first session of the National Assembly of Botswana. From the very first day of independence he was a close associate of President Seretse Khama. In 1962, Khama and Masire founded the Botswana Democratic Party representing the interests of most peasants, tribal chiefs and some intellectuals. After the death of Seretse Khama, on July 18, 1980, Masire was elected president by the National Assembly.

Western barbarians in the ancient capital

The importance of having a sense of humour and being self-critical

When they brought in the ice–cream, it meant that the reception was nearly over. The way the cooks by the grills and geishas by the empty trays were looking at us showed that they could not wait for us to leave. The international crowd was rapidly vanishing. A chain of tuxedo-clad hosts looked like a guard of honour. They kept shaking hands with and smiling to the outgoing guests.

"They say you made quite a speech today," the mayor of Kioto held my hand in his. The procession stopped: the almost perfect mechanism of leaving glitched.

I heard the words "Novoye vremya," "Novoye vremya" (*New Times*) whispered along the chain in the manner soldiers pass their commander's words as they march in formation.

"They say you made quite a speech today," the deputy mayor repeated when he shook my hand and his jet-black eyes sparked with hidden anger. The others did not say anything, but each handshake was a warning.

What did I say?

A miracle in the basement

When the International Press Institute chose Kioto as the venue of its 40th jubilee session, it was the perfect choice. For ten centuries Kioto was the capital city of Japan and today it is by right considered the jewel of the Japanese national culture. There are fifteen hundred Buddhist temples and two hundred Sintoist shrines in Kyoto. Thanks to the American Japanologists who were wise enough to talk their president out of bombing Kioto during the war, the four hundred journalists from all over the world, as well as politicians, ministers, ambassadors, bankers and other participants of the IPI sitting had an excellent chance to enjoy the ancient city bathing in sakura blossom.

Another miracle was known only to Peter Galliner, director of the IPI and his four assistants who came down from London. That miracle were the Japanese organizers of the session who acted according to a principle repulsive for most Soviets: when you give a promise, you keep it. The Japanese miracle was out of sight of the participants and happened in the basement which Galliner's assistants affectionately called "prison."

I was to speak on the topic which dominated the first day of the session: "Japan as a world power."

The former prime minister of Australia, the towering Malcolm Frazer, who received a lashing from *New Times* about a decade ago for his anti-popular policies, dwelled at length about economic cooperation in the Pacific region. After the magic word GATT started to be mentioned every other second, most participants got weary.

The former Japanese Ambassador to the United Kingdom, Kazuo Chiba, and the *Asahi* senior writer, Yoichi Funabashi, competing in their mastery of English, retold the official and the opposition viewpoints on Japan's foreign policy. The official viewpoint was that the Japanese policy was perfect. The opposition one was that Japan could do even better.

Churchill was mistaken. So was I

The Soviet speaker was the last to get the floor and by that time the exhausted audience percepted the appearance of each new speaker as something tantamount to a personal insult. What was I speaking about?

Winston Churchill was rarely mistaken, but he did make a mistake in 1924 when he said: "Japan is half the world away. There is no way Japan could endanger our vital interests." Churchill's was a double mistake. In 1941 the Japanese army and navy became a formidable threat to the British interests. Today the booming Japanese industry is a threat to British producers. And not only British producers, for that matter.

Perhaps, I should have added that the Soviet people representing the state that together with its allies defeated Japan forty-six years ago, feel especially bitter realizing that the Japanese managed to exploit even the defeat to their country's advantage are now living incomparably better than the Soviet victors.

Today some people admire the Japanese miracle, others condemn it, because few people ever rejoice at somebody else's success. One US Congressman, angered with the Japanese infiltration of the American market, remarked: "We ought to be grateful to Harry Truman who dropped two A-bombs on Japan. However, he should have dropped four."

Japanese politicians complain that their country is not taken seriously in international

affairs. Japan wants to be a world power, but her role in international affairs is very small, sometimes negligible. From the side it may seem that the Japanese are concerned only with themselves and try to keep clear of any events that do not directly affect Japan.

However, the participation in international affairs is not a privilege but a duty. There is nothing pleasant in spending money that could be used for domestic development, on defence and aid to other countries. This duty must be understood and assumed by those states that want, first, to protect their own interests in this world and second, to save this world from castastrophes.

Japan's insular position defines her geopolitical attitudes and approaches: Japan has always been safe from outside invasions. After World War II the United States stepped in as the guarantor of Japanese security. Can one suppose that Japan is going to keep foreign troops on her territory for ever? And if the troops finally go, how will the Japanese government guarantee the security of its people? By declaring an urgent militarization?

Inevitably, there rises the question of the Japanese army's future. Japan's neighbours do not want to see Japan re-militarized and that is why they do not object to the presence of US military bases in Japan. But in the event of a regional conflict, like the conflict between Iraq and Kuwait, Japan will be of no use for the international community.

Japan will be criticized for not increasing her defence spendings and will be condemned if she does increase those spendings.

By itself, no build-up of the armed forces can save the problem of national security. Even the most powerful navy will not help Japan if Middle Eastern states refuse to pump oil to Japan. That is why Tokyo's is a cautious policy designed to suit all sides. But does this policy really guarantee security?

Some like it, others don't

To my surprise I noticed that something was going wrong in the audience. Some people were obviously pleased with my words. Others were dissapointed. Pleased were the Americans. Dissapointed were the Japanese.

The international community is more serious towards those countries which participate in common affairs and display generosity, than towards those who prefer to stay isolated and concern themselves only with their own affairs. To play a leading role in the world is not enough to have economic and military might, it is also necessary to overcome egoism, to learn to see one's country as part of the world community of nations. Do the Japanese, the Japanese leaders in particular, possess these qualities?

President Charles de Gaulle once called a Japanese Prime Minister "a transistor dealer." This is not a pleasant thing to hear. The corporate Japanese society has not produced a single world-class leader. To be more precise, that society has not let any leader develop into a world-class leader. It has not required bold and visionary steps from anyone. Despite the tremendous economic successes and self-confidence generated by those successes, despite that the Japanese are today travelling around the world more than any other nation, the Japanese mentality has remained isolationist and dominated by the vision of the world consisting of Japan on the one side and the rest of the world on the other.

I could have put it more strongly: the long isolation from the rest of the world has produced a heritage of arrogance. Several Japanese prime ministers had to resign after Western media had published some of their private conversations, because something of what they said sounded absolutely racist – for instance the utterings about the low intellectual level of Puerto Ricans, Blacks and Koreans. Very often Japan voices the desire to represent Asia in the world politics. For example as the sixth member of the UN Security Council. The Japanese insist they understand the peoples of South East Asia and those people understand them. In reality, though, Japan has never been and is not trusted in Asia...

The Japanese are too egocentric. The vision of Japan against the rest of the world is deep-rooted in their minds. Subconsciously, the Japanese feel as if they were in a shell, a sheath, a cave. They need to recognize themselves as part of the world. Referring to traditional features of the Japanese mentality is not convincing on the threshold of the third millenium.

All this is not needed solely for becoming a world leader. The world does not need leaders, it does not need great powers, it needs help. What the world wants from Japan is not leadership but the return of old debts. After 1945 the world helped Japan, today it is time Japan helped the Third World.

The neutral and prosperous Switzerland could be an example for Japan. But Switzerland is in an exceptionally friendly environment of European states. There is nothing like the European security system in Asia. Such a system must be created and Japan cannot hope to travel for free on that train.

But Japan is not prepared to play a significant role in world politics. Soviet-Japanese relations give me enough reasons to say that.

Bitter truth about the islands

Everybody is fed up with all that talk about the islands. So much was said about them before, during and after Gorbachev's visit to Japan. The Japanese, however, continue to hope that some day the Soviet Union would hand the islands over to them, which is impossible.

I do not have a slightest desire to justify Soviet diplomacy. In 1945, Joseph Stalin would have readily occupied Northern Hokkaido too, had not Truman resolutely opposed such intentions. The Soviet delegation headed by Andrei Gromyko walked out of the San Frncisco peace conference without signing the peace treaty with Japan. Khrushchev

promised to return two islands but then backpedalled on that promise.

The reason of Moscow's errors vis-à-vis Japan is that Moscow had always underestimated Japan seeing her as an insignificant power with little or no international influence. The Soviet Union does not need anything special from Japan. May be the Soviet Union would have taken something it is given for free. But the Japanese give nothing for free.

I have been criticizing Moscow's policies vis-à-vis Japan for several years in *New Times*. Now I must say that Japanese politicians and diplomats have missed their chance as well. They have not accomplished what they started in 1956. The Japanese Foreign Ministry is as centred on America as the Soviet Foreign Ministry. Tokyo has always believed that it must be cautious in relations with the USSR and must never display intitative.

It was senseless to count on Stalin's moral principles. But Khrushchev could be talked into returning the islands. Even Brezhnev would have traded them in exchange for large-scale cooperation. Both Krushchev and Brezhnev were absolute rulers of the country.

I believe that after 1985 it has become impossible to return the islands. It is difficult to imagine the federal parliament and the parliament of Russia voting or giving up part of the country's territory in the context when most people regard territorial concessions as "selling the motherland down the river."

What follows from all this? The Soviet Union could afford ignoring Japan. Let me repeat that I am not justifying the Soviet policy, I am only stating the reality. But Japan, who needs the islands, could not afford ignoring the USSR. The fact that all post-war generations of Japanese politicians have ignored the USSR, suggests that Japan is not prepared to play a serious role in the world politics.

How Herman Kahn let me down

"Small countries – Portugal, The Netherlands, England – also became world leaders, but they soon lost their leadership.

The 19th century was the century of Britain. The 20th century has become the American century. The 21st century will be the century of Japan." I read this prediction of the American futurologist, Herman Kahn, in the year when I started learning Japanese. The prospect of becoming an expert in the affairs of the would-be world leader, helped me as I struggled with the Japanese language and graphics.

I have never regretted the time I spent learning Japanese, although Hermann Kahn had let me down. The 21st century will not be the century of Japan. Japan will not become a superpower.

I finished my speech. The audience applauded. The hosts looked at me with a mixture of pity and indignation in their eyes. Ambassador Chiba promised to argue it up with me in the wings of the session, but obviously was too busy to do it.

In the lobby of the session, in the bus and at the final reception, American participants winked at me and smiled. When the Japanese hosts looked another way, Americans shook my hand. As for the Japanese IPI members, they were quick to learn the two Russian words: "Novoye vremya" (*New Times*).

The tremendous economic successes and the global admiration have played a nasty trick on the Japanese themselves. They have started to treat all foreigners with an air of condescending compassion (though very often justified): the people who cannot come near the Japanese level of effectiveness and inventiveness, can they be worth much?

The words that Japan would never be a great power were a soothing balm on the wounds of Americans and Europeans. Why are they so shy themselves?

... This happened about one hundred years ago near Kioto. A group of British travellers was unwise enough not to give way to a prince's procession. One Briton was killed, two more wounded.

The Western barbarians had to be cautious in the ancient capital of Japan.

I remembered being paraded past a row of jet-black sparkling eyes and decided I got away lightly.

Leonid Mlechin
KIOTO-MOSCOW

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Your ideas in the Soviet press – just at the time when the Soviet Union's gigantic market is opening up for the world

The view from Novo-Ogaryovo

Foreign leaders' visits to Moscow are increasingly becoming an occasion for discussing not only international problems, but also the situation in the USSR. François Mitterrand's short visit has not been an exception from this rule either. His firm support for Mikhail Gorbachev has been seen as having a particular significance against the backdrop of the almost trite questions: Does it make sense to count only on Soviet President? How much is he in control? Doesn't he need contacts with the West first of all to ensure the support for his position inside his own country? Lately they were supplemented by one more question: Isn't the Soviet Union returning to the cold war? Not all of them need to be answered here, although their statement is also politics.

Alexei Kozhemyakov, LL.D

It seems to me that the results of the François Mitterrand's discussions in Novo-Ogaryovo leave no doubt that he intends to assist not only the President, but also perestroika.

Yet what is the basis for the Soviet-French mutual understanding in this day and age when Western partners experience a strong temptation to put on hold the dialogue with the dangerously sick superpower until they get a clear idea in which direction the crisis is going to develop? It seems that least of all this position is based on illusions and emotions, although the admiration for the courage of those who initiated the transformations expressed by the French president was not a mere diplomatic courtesy. I think that there are two reasons for this understanding.

The first reason is the political experience and world outlook of François Mitterrand himself. His long experience in politics, that has far from always been a gratifying one, has trained him to the struggle, and not to an untroubled ruling. He is one of those world figures who have realized that the transformations that were started in the Soviet Union could not, in principle, proceed smoothly. The experience of Western democracy shows that it is always exacting and not always grateful. Michel Montaigne, for whom François Mitterrand has great regard, remarked that in the periods similar to the times we live in people take delight in trampling down what in the past inspired them with awe and easily submit to accidental influence and illusions.

The second reason is foreign policy considerations proper and the understanding that the Soviet Union will continue to exist representing an important factor in European and world politics without which it is impossible to build realistic approaches to the future, especially to that of Europe. The ideas of a European confederation, a common home co-authored by the two presidents have partly lost their topical character today to a large extent due to our internal disorders. The prospect of dealing with uncertain membership of participants from the East in this common European home can hardly be welcomed by Western countries. The only way out is the continuation of the dialogue while patiently waiting for and contributing to the stabilization and making progress in solving the problems in connection with the treaty on conventional armaments that have given rise to the West's mistrust of the Soviet Union. This was precisely what the French president has come to Moscow for.

Of course, the guest does not have any illusions regarding our internal problems. His phrase: "I hope this is not our last meeting?" was hardly accidental. He was not at all confused either by the question about how his recent meeting with Boris Yeltsin went off. It is clear that the field of foreign policy activities of the republics is going to expand, but it has to have certain limits since they are part of a federal state. I think that the visit of the head of Russian parliament to France has demonstrated that the West is not yet ready for our decentralized foreign policy. As for the ability to solve with tact the problems of protocol the French have shown themselves to be dab hands at it.

Has France given our central government a "pledge of loyalty"?

Does it mean that France has given a "pledge of loyalty" to our central government? Here, too, one should not be under a delusion, for real politics does not exclude other variants. Already today they sometimes call for the first-hand "staking out" of the processes going on in the republics, and French diplomats in Moscow, Kiev and Leningrad, where they have their diplomatic missions, have already been doing that job. Besides, one of the new aspects in the French policy in Eastern Europe is the recognition of the importance of respect for the rights of ethnic minorities. At the same time, it seems that the breaking of the "pledge," if it is to happen at all, will take place only after we ourselves make up our minds about the future of the Union.

The burden of our problems sometimes may create the impression that all questions are concentrated in the East and all answers – in the West. Such an approach would be an oversimplification, although the problems of West Europeans are different in terms of their acuteness and urgency. To what extent will bilateral ties preserve their significance in conditions of Western Europe's movement towards a political union, and in perspective, probably, even towards common foreign policy and defence? What will the relations between France and NATO be like then? How will common defence blend with the Atlantic solidarity? What will guarantee the preservation of a harmonious balance inside the unified Europe itself? In the past we would have readily interpreted such questions with the view of taking advantage of the contradictions. Yet the time of such approaches has passed. It is giving way to the responsibility for the future of Europe, the contribution to which can be made today first of all through ensuring a reliable stability in our own home.

Weapons instead of arguments

Ethnic conflicts have pushed the country to the brink of a civil war

It looks as if Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union are competing to see who will disintegrate first. The Yugoslavian republics seem to have come to the conclusion, all at once, that all of them were the losers as a result of their cohabitation under the roof of one state. Let the worst should come to the worst, they have decided to change Yugoslavia's system of government and to leave it to their leaders to decide what a new one should be like.

Bringing the leaders of several states together and organizing a summit meeting is no easy matter. Today it has turned out to be more difficult still, in today's Yugoslavia, to assemble the leaders of its republics around a negotiating table. The differences between the constituent parts of the Yugoslavian federation are so substantial now that the leaders of its Republics sometimes find it easier to make a deal with a neighbouring state than with another "fraternal" republic. Incidentally the Republics of Yugoslavia are actively acquiring the attributes of statehood. The talk that negotiations between them will presently be referred to as international doesn't sound all that fantastic, after all.

The present political power centres in the Republics appeared not today or yesterday but long before the triumph of the non-communist opposition at multi-party elections. For years, the differences between the republics were damped down by the League of Communists of Yugoslavia which, while in power made every effort to prevent the Federation from "softening up." When the opposition came to power in individual Yugoslavian republics separatist tendencies intensified because ideological differences were added to ethnic ones.

The Republics' leaders conducting negotiations today often look like television announcers reading from prepared texts. Not that there are no strong personalities among them. Far from it. The whole thing is over each of them there hangs, like a Damocles sword, the interests of "his" ethnic group and the apprehension that any compromise will be regarded "at home" as a manifestation of weakness, and any concession – as treason.

Therefore, joint statements by the Republics' leaders on the results of each round of the Summit resemble a list of the Republics' positions rather than their common approach to the settlement of the crisis in Yugoslavia.

The question of whether Yugoslavia is to be a federation or a confederation has now given way to a new one: is it possible to preserve Yugoslavia as a single state? The model which Slovenia and Croatia have to offer is a union of sovereign states. How this union will function is anybody's guess. Slovenians and Croatians regard a "divorce" with the other republics as the alternative to their option. Serbia and Montenegro, which uphold the idea of Yugoslavia as a sovereign state, do not object to the republics which want to divorce the others doing so without hindrance. In that case, however, they will have to secure their international recognition on their own because the rest of the country will keep its name – Yugoslavia.

Paradoxically, the greatest understanding often arises between Slovenia and Serbia – the republics which have been quarrelling with each other for most of the past two years. Many explain this by the fact that both have already told each other "goodbye", obviously to make it clear that they will never get along under one roof. The Slovenian leaders keep reiterating that they have no illusions about the negotiations now in progress. Their decision to withdraw from Yugoslavia this July remains in force.

Slovenia's determination to get its independence at all costs seems to cause special concern to Croatia which has hastened to announce that without the Slovenians it is not going to stay in Yugoslavia, either. Bosnia and Herzegovina, with their motley ethnic palette, constitute the tightest knot of contradictions which are beyond reconciliation so far. One gets the impression that hadn't it been for this ethnic heterogeneity, the Yugoslavian Republics would have "divorced" long ago without saying goodbye.

The current problems are hard to solve in a quiet atmosphere, let alone in a situation where the country finds itself on the verge of a civil war now and again. Their solution is hindered, more often then not, by clashes which occur in the parts of Croatia inhabited by Serbians. The Croatian-Serbian factor makes the prospect for Croatia breaking away from Yugoslavia unrealistic (without bloodshed, at any rate).

If the republics attain full independence, the need for an independent arbitrator will arise. So the public turns its gaze to neutral organs of power. However, the SFRY Presidium, the collective president of the country, is in no position today to play the role of a shrewd judge. It also comprises representatives of the Republics who, whether they want it or not, are compelled to uphold their positions. If they show discretion and try to find compromises, the members of this government body may be forced to resign from their posts. This is probably true of such presidiums and councils in any multinational state.

The arbiter's role may be assumed by the public if the fate of Yugoslavia is decided through a referendum. Having agreed in principle on the need to hold it, the leaders of the Republics remain divided on a number of issues involved in organizing the referendum. They seem to be in a hurry to part with one another as soon as possible.



Zagreb streets resemble those of Stepanakert

Photo from Newsweek (USA)

Gennady Sysoyev,
our own correspondent
– BELGRADE

A bugging scandal

A bugging device was recently discovered in the offices of the National Human Rights Committee set up under the auspices of President Carlos Salinas de Gortari. The Committee was only getting into its stride and could not yet annoy the authorities. Its chairman, Jorge Carpiso, in whose room the "bug" was detected, lodged a protest with the Prosecutor of the Republic and seems to make the affair a hot potato. An official investigation has been started. The potential "defendants" from the Ministry of the Interior flatly spurn all charges. The authorities are trying to calm the passions, saying that the device did not even have a battery.

Their desire to hush up the affair can be understood. The government is having a rather hard time now. When preparations for setting up a zone of free trade with the United States, the Salinas Cabinet's cherished aim, were going full blast, Mexico began to receive cheerless news from its northern neighbour. For various reasons opposition to the giant project is growing in the US Congress, where debates on the issue are to open soon. In an interview with this correspondent Congressman Jim Kolbe, who recently spoke in the American Chamber of Commerce in Mexico, said that the advocates and opponents of a trade agreement had short odds. The latter will certainly try to take advantage of the "electronic espionage" affair to cast aspersions on Mexico's political system.

The election campaign is around the corner, and the ruling party will have to fight for seats in the parliament and local councils. President Salinas, who undertook to overhaul the old system, which guaranteed his party quiet life in power but was severely criticized by the local opposition and human rights organizations abroad, could boast of some achievements. And at this time someone, possibly even from among his associates, queered the pitch for him.

The scandal is growing in the meantime. It is being played up by America's Watch, the leading human rights organization in the United States. Mexican socio-political groups, especially the Greens, allege that "electronic espionage" is becoming total in the country. "Wiretapping is spread as widely as the bribing of traffic police," a Mexican journalist complained in a conversation with me.

Incidentally, the Association of Foreign Journalists in Mexico, of which the *New Times* correspondent is also a member, threatens to carry out an investigation into the possible eavesdropping on its members. Each of us could surely recall not a few curious episodes from his own experience of using the telephone.

Yuri Kudimov,
our own correspondent

MEXICO



Drawing by Victor Bogorad

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That sweet word, consensus

Contrary to wishes and frequent incantations, no social consensus has been achieved in this country over the years of perestroika. But then, is such a consensus really a necessary prerequisite for democracy?

Sergei Khenkin,
Cand.Sc.(History)

Can a consensus be reached only after one of the alternatives of social progress has emerged victorious from a fierce contest between them, and all the social forces have adapted themselves to a new reality?

It would be useful, perhaps, to take a close look at the experience already gained by the countries which have dismantled, or are just dismantling, their totalitarian or authoritarian structures.

The Spanish model

Spain's changeover from dictatorship to democracy has no parallels in the history of the 20th century. The Franco dictatorship died a peaceful death as a result of its own contradictions and pressure from below, rather than of a military defeat or overthrow. The former confrontation gave way to civilized forms of peaceful coexistence between opposite socio-political forces.

A democratic consesus was achieved in Spain thanks to a profound revaluation of values by Francoists and anti-Francoists alike. One of the first steps towards national conciliation was made by Franco himself whose policy, incidentally, was marked by flexibility. He seized on the idea of healing the rift between "two Spains," put forward by opposition circles, and ordered the construction of a memorial complex to which the remains of Spanish Civil War dead – both the "winners" and the "losers" – were moved. In the seventies, many followers of the Caudillo came to the conclusion that Spain could not do without political pluralism any longer. Having legalized Left-wing parties and trade unions, held democratic elections to central and local government bodies and granted autonomy to ethnic regions, they accepted many values of those "defeated" in the Civil War and gave in to the demands over which the Right-wing forces had once rose up in arms against the Republic.

King Juan Carlos I had a special role to play in eradicating Francoism. Remaining behind the scenes most of the time, he acted as an arbiter reconciling different social interests. His Majesty has used all his influence to democratize the army created by Franco, to ensure its strict neutrality and allegiance to law, to rule out its serving the interests of this or that political organization. For their part, the anti-Francoists gave up their plans for "retribution" and "revenge" and recognized monarchy.

National accord is based on Most Spaniards' adherence to democratic values, political moderation and non-acceptance of extremism. Their disposition towards compromises is largely due to the horrors of the Civil War, still within living memory, and to the fear of the prospect of an ultra-Right coup.

Degrees of comparison

As they dismantled dictatorships, the Spaniards carried out the political democratisation of their society, in the main. Francoist Spain had kept private property ownership and a free market economy (even though restricted). The standard of living was quite high. A farewell to Francoism was preceded, in the sixties and the early seventies, by an economic boom unprecedented in the country's history which caused a dramatic rise in welfare standards for millions. As a result, most people did not suffer much from the subsequent economic crisis which coincided there (as was also the case in the USSR) with democratization.

The emergence of civil society, independent of the state, within the authoritarian regime largely facilitated the subsequent achievement of social accord and the transition to democracy.

The Spaniards succeeded in making an impressive headway towards the solution of their ethnic problems. Francoist "national unity" gave way to "a state of autonomies" – a compromise of sorts between the centralist unitarian state and the outlying regions. True, Spain's local authorities – just like ours – are demanding more independence and more powers.

For all the undeniable similarities, the ethnic problem is much more acute in our country than it is in Spain. In the latter, the population of the autonomies is more united in its striving to preserve the integrity of the state (expert for the Basque Country separatists who want full independence). Finally, in Spain ethnic conflicts occur mainly between the centre and the periphery, while in our country they often break out within the periphery as well with all the ensuing consequences (bloody violence and crowds of refugees).

While Spain changed over to democracy from a "purely" authoritarian regime, the USSR's point of departure is a totalitarian regime, even if not "ideal" totalitarianism Stalin-type. The former way is a much simpler one. The Spanish record goes to show that the gap between authoritarianism and democracy is not too wide: the trend towards the liberalization of the regime is backed by the ever strengthening civil society and by an anti-authoritarian alliance formed by different public forces. And what about the gap between totalitarianism and democracy? In history, there has never been a case of a totalitarian regime peacefully transforming into a democratic one. This process, which presupposes the emergence of all the spheres of public life from state control, is extremely complicated and multi-stage.

Looking at our neighbours

Notably, most of the East European countries which have embarked upon the bumpy and untrodden path of dismantling party and state systems of a pseudo-socialist type have also found it easier to reach a consensus. Whereas in the USSR command-administrative socialism was "home-made", in East Europe it was something forcefully imposed on it from the outside, and remained genetically alien, a foreign matter which had to be expelled. The differences in the degree of the regimes' "totalitarianism" also manifested themselves in the process. In the East-European countries Party and state monopoly was neither as strong, nor as

all-pervading as ours. Many of them kept private property ownership in the agrarian sector and in the service sphere, had elements of political pluralism (the influence of the church, a multi-party system, even though a symbolic one); most people still kept the memory of the pre-war past.

The discontent of the public at large with the undivided sway of top Party bureaucracy expedited the reaching of a democratic type consensus in a number of East European countries on the need for creating a law-governed state and for a transition to the market economy. Incidentally, some of the former leaders revised their views and reached a compromise with the forces in opposition to them. Romania and Bulgaria seem to be the only countries where a broad public consensus was not achieved. The legacy of the past is strongly manifest there, the degree of the ideological and political polarization in public life is high.

In many countries of the former "Eastern bloc", however, the consensus is not too strong as yet, and the changeover to a new model of society is far from over. Scientists and journalists have aptly described the present situation as "democratorship": a part of the social space has already been taken over by democracy, but in the rest of it the methods and mentality of dictatorship still reign supreme. It is in the economy that "democratorship" manifests itself to the greatest extent. Until resolute steps are taken to privatize property, the economy is run by command methods and remains the basis of administrative socialism. The new pluralist structure rests on the old foundation, and the resultant duality of interests in society is fraught with abrupt turns in the policy pursued by different social forces and with the weakening of the consensus.

Today political stability and social accord in the countries of "real socialism" are facing an acid test connected with the transition to the market economy. The renunciation of the command administrative economy will be accompanied by the legalization of unemployment, inflation, a temporary decline in the standard of living and a social polarization of society. Hundreds of thousands of people who have got accustomed, over the past decades, to a formally guaranteed employment and have never been looking for jobs are now losing their confidence in the morrow. Besides that, the changeover to the market economy involves, for some workers, a radical change in their attitude to work. The market economy, with its tough competition, calls for an all-out effort, unknown in the previous economic system.

The turbulent growth of nationalism presents another danger to social accord. Yugoslavia and Czecho-Slovakia are now all but falling apart. Ethnic relations have become strained in other countries as well, some of which are facing the prospect of out-and-out nationalist forces gaining enough control to force society back into dictatorship.

A tug-of-war

An analysis of other countries' experience in abolishing dictatorships suggests that in Soviet society it will be much more difficult than anywhere else to reach an accord on basic values. There is no denying the fact that over the years of perestroika our society has gone a long way towards social and political tolerance. Nevertheless, no wide-ranging social accord has been achieved. This is hardly to be surprised at: is it possible at all to reconcile the incompatible interests of the democratic forces seeking to carry out profound reforms, on the one hand, and those of the economic bureaucracy, military-industrial complex, opposed to such reforms, on the other; the interests of the Republics, working for genuine sovereignty, on the one hand, and the interests of the conservative forces in the Centre which deny them sovereignty, on the other? Perestroika has become a notion which means different things to different people and to different sections of society. To some it means free market and democracy; to others, the strengthening of "renewed state socialism," to still others, free market without democratization or democratization without free market...

The lack of a consensus here is only natural: profound social revolutions rule it out. Such a revolution is regarded by the public as a crushing blow on the old way of life, on the long-established cliches – a blow which splits society into opposite camps. Accord (real or imaginary) is achieved only after the outcome of the clash between these camps has been decided, and the social forces which have emerged victorious from it carry all before it. Consequently, the numerous calls for a consensus now being heard are nothing but illusions which can only mislead those who believe in them. Thinking that national accord on the basic value is possible is tantamount to taking seriously the myth about the "monolithic unity" of the Soviet people.

At the same time, the absence of consensus does not mean that various socio-political forces have discontinued their dialogue and their search for contacts and for agreements on specific issues between them. The record of perestroika has shown that mutually acceptable compromises are quite feasible.

A broad consensus – openly or tacitly recognized by different forces – on the renunciation of violence and on using peaceful and bloodless forms of struggle only is of special importance today. Such a consensus will determine the "rules of the game" for all. Fierce socio-political struggle, inevitable in our society, should never be allowed to break civil peace and to develop into a civil war. The democratic forces are to play the leading role in asserting this simple truth. Their concerted efforts can stop those clamouring for the "iron hand" and make peaceful parliamentary forms of co-existence a norm of our life. ■

Drawing by Arkady Gursky

DESTINIES

More than teacher, more than prophet



Photo by Yuri Rost

70th birthday of Andrei Sakharov on May 21

Vittorio Strada

Sakharov was not the only scientist, who instead of being completely engrossed in laboratory research discovered at one or another point in his career that there existed a world outside the walls of his study and realized that there a very special bond linked his particular realm of science and the habitat of the human race. This bond is of a moral civic order, and all employed in fields of science and technology that touch upon the very destinies of the human race are horrified when they suddenly discover it. Then the scientist comes to realize that at stake is his own humaneness, which he may lose if wholly devoted to nothing but science, if shirking responsibility for the possible results, if failing to realize his obligations as a member of a national and metanational commonalty.

Yet in Andrei Sakharov's case, everything was far more complex than for any of his colleagues, who suffered such anguish when they realized that their research was geared exclusively to the aims of war and destruction, as, for instance, Robert Oppenheimer. Sakharov was obliged to work in a totalitarian dictatorship not in a democratic society. Some may think the difference unconditional, and others not, which occurred. Though the decades when the communist totalitarian regime, in its consummate Soviet version was believed even by part of Western public opinion to be of a higher order than liberal democratic capitalism. No wonder some Western scientists collaborated with the Soviet regime.

Sakharov, who was born and bred in a totalitarian society, for long stayed loyal to the regime, not because he had consciously chosen to do so, but because he subconsciously identified himself with it. The work he did in collaboration with other scientists who were to give the Soviet Union nuclear weaponry was carried on not merely in a secret place, as in any country in the case of similar projects, but in direct contact with the GULAG. Every morning the young scientist watched prisoners led to work.

In a Europe rid of Nazi concentration camps, that was of course unique, and too was the fact that organizationally the research that Sakharov and his colleagues conducted was totally subordinated to Lavrenty Beria.

Evolution and convergence

Anyone who has read Sakharov's reminiscences will know how Sakharov developed from a brilliant scientist devoid of social awareness into a fearless fully responsible citizen. This was transition from darkness into light, which many inside and outside the USSR experienced, inasmuch as affiliation with this country implied an ideological dependency far transcending its borders. Many Western progressives initially regarded communism and the USSR as fulfilment of hopes for social fairness; only later did they wake up and realize that they had been deluded. Sakharov's evolution was more than that of a scientist becoming aware of the nightmarish dangers with which the results of his work are pregnant. Sakharov, fully aware of the death-dealing nature of a possible nuclear conflict, championed his efforts to achieve thermonuclear weaponry as he believed it essential to strike a balance between the two superpowers.

How the scales dropped from Sakharov's eyes was different. On the one hand, he became increasingly convinced that the political, ideological and social system in which he lived and for which he worked was unacceptable. On the other hand, his world outlook broadened, eventually evolving a new outlook as to the future of the human race, so absurdly divided between self-styled socialism and insuperable capitalism. In the same way as by his research he sought to establish a firm equilibrium in the field of weaponry between the two opposed sides, so in his political activity he sought parity between these two sides, envisaging the prospect as one of peace and of democracy, not totalitarianism. Under Sakharov's projects for convergence between the two blocs, the Soviet Union was to regain those civil and political freedoms that genuinely guarantee peace, freedoms that communist totalitarianism had spurned and demolished. As for capitalism, as already enjoying these freedoms, it was to continue with socialist type reforms, relying on its liberal democratic institutions.

Pointless to explain

Vladimir Ritus, scientific collegaue, of Sakharov's says: "Whereas it looks as if we all seek the answer by using the rules taught, he intuitively felt it, seeking to reach it as one whole, not step by step."

In a certain sense, Sakharov as physicist, was endowed with the gift of immediately sensing intricate physical phenomena in all their inner simplicity. No wonder he ran ahead of many colleagues, who found it necessary, now and again indirectly, to repeat step by step the journey his thoughts had travelled. Without indulging in superficial analogies between the different spheres of intellectual effort, one may say that in the area of social politics Sakharov's mind followed in effect the same train of reasoning. The only difference was that his "revelations" here so understandable and acceptable to democratic thought encountered hostility from the totalitarian mentality.

It is not even worth-while to try to explain to a Soviet or non-Soviet communist leadership, including Western communists, the process of reasoning behind the solutions Sakharov evolved for the socio-political problems facing mankind. Communist ideology completely negated such solutions as proceeding from a rational analysis of today's world not from ambitions to attain supremacy. Sakharov's futurological intuition derived from the entrenchment of democratic values as leading to the solution of economic problems, from championship of intellectual liberties and political pluralism, from the enunciation of true coexistence, having nothing of that secret aspiration for hegemony and aggrandizement, and true convergence, from an awareness of the ecological responsibility that the knowledge of science and technology bears to all mankind. This was the product of scientific cognition and conscience wedded to political action within the immediate reality of his time and his country.

Neither time nor country were capable of assimilating such sober lofty calls, as then the Soviet Union and the communist world generally were completely subjugated to ideology and a system which had made of falsehood and violence the pillars upon which the rule of the party caste rested. The further Sakharov progressed in his search for the truth, the further he distanced himself from the regime, which he served as scientist in the belief that he was working for the common weal. His scientific services and his global prestige in some degree restrained the ruthless harrassment to which the communist system subjected him. His internal exile (his deportation to Gorky), that worst penalty for him, continued until the communist authority itself was compelled to admit that the solutions Sakharov had proposed for socio-political problems were correct in principle and that he was needed not only ;and not so much as physicist, but primarily as a freely thinking citizen.

"Eppur si mouve!"

As a civic spirited thinker Sakharov gave a new slant to the celebrated "Eppur si mouve!" ("It moves nevertheless!") implying no concessions. Beneath the carapace of petrified stagnation, the reality in his country started to move and with it, and also due to it, international reality likewise moved. While others not afraid to note the real state of affairs and to call for an organized movement against the guardians of in-the-rut conservatism paid with their lives and with eviction for their wisdom and courage, Sakharov, who escaped death thanks to his international prestige, acquired the privilege, when back from internal exile, of at once immersing himself into the very thick of socio-political life. This was a great good fortune for the entire country, which so desperately needed a man like him, inasmuch as the restricted reforms from above, to which the authorities agreed in the face of the threat of universal disaster were not enough; what was needed firstly was to regain the right and duty that every citizen has to be free.

That was no picnic, especially considering that even after the weakening of totalitarian oppression as it gradually slipped into authoritarianism, people had to re-acquire the ability to think and engage in civic action, which the communist authority had so systematically exorcized by physical and ideological violence. Russia, indeed the entire Soviet Union, stood in need of an example, not from outside, not even from the pre-revolutionary past, but one rooted in the appalling post-revolutionary experience, so as to shed that experience and go over to democracy.

Andrei Sakharov demonstrated that he



Drawing by Arkady Gursky

was more than a teacher, more than a prophet, preaching lofty but abstract truths from the pulpit. He showed himself to be a man of thought and action, who, while belonging to the national commonalty, yet stood in opposition to this commonalty for the sake of a new commonalty, that would not hold itself hostilely aloof from the entire world for the sake of an absurd ideology, but would creatively enter this world.

Half friends-half foes

We all know that in his final years Sakharov had to contend with foes and half friends. His foes saw him as the carrier of principles inimical to that bogus monolithic wholeness, which every pluralism threatens. These are pseudo-patriots, enemies of the authentic patriotism of all whose faith in their own country is so profound that they do not seek to doom it to eternal wardship from the authorities. These are the blockheaded inhabitants of the bygone world which is rooted in xenophobia and resistance to everything new, in no small degree in antisemitism, a world that signifies material backwardness and spiritual oppression.

Among Sakharov's half-friends, half-foes too were people who while acknowledging his right to be free and even restoring that freedom to him would wish to stop at half-way house or, even worse, look for a third way between totalitarianism and democracy, between planned economy and market economy, between international cooperation and hidden hegemonic ambitions. Note that Sakharov's last public statement at the Congress of People's Deputies was interrupted by Mikhail Gorbachev, that self-same Gorbachev who though having remedied the injustice and ending the scientist's internal exile, was still far removed not only from Sakharov's positions, but, chiefly and mainly, from the intellectual and moral freedom that the great physicist upheld to his end with such fidelity. Sakharov was never the party bureaucrat, even one realizing that certain changes in the political regime are essential to preserve the substance or at least, put off its crisis for as long as conceivably possible.

Vs. the death sentence

We must necessarily view a man like Sakharov in all his exceptional unique stature and yet realize that he was in the same camp with a whole range of free people in his own country, the so-called dissidents. Sakharov was a novelty inside the Soviet and communist world: yet he personified also the continuity or rather a restored continuity with pre-revolutionary Russia.

There is something symbolic in that another Sakharov, his grandfather, was one of the editors of a wonderful book entitled *Versus the Death Sentence* put out in Russia in 1906. A collection of essays by writers, lawyers, philosophers, both Russians and Western, explaining their inacceptance of the death sentence, this book, like many other books published in Russia at the time, presents a model of liberal and democratic politico-legal thinking, which refuting the legend then current in the world, demonstrated its viability in pre-revolutionary Russia. After all, modern Russian culture comprises not only revolutionary radical extremism, even terrorism; it also contrains a powerful liberal-democratic and social democratic trend, which makes it kin with free, prolific West European thought. Andrei Sakharov consciously or not, is of that tradition. Similarly as his grandfather contributed to the struggle against the death sentence, so did Sakharov resist not so much the death sentence, as that system of death, which the communist regime personifies. But whereas his grandfather could feel safe in a gradually democratizing non-totalitarian society, Sakharov had to pay for his love of freedom, as one always has to pay under a totalitarian regime even should it be on its last legs.

Sakharov's Russia is the Russia of the future and the Russia of the past, a synthesis that implies neither a pipe dream, nor restoration. Underlying the convergence of these two Russias is the current Soviet history that Sakharov experienced when realizing that it was vital to put paid to this history. His aim to restore the Russia of the past does not at all imply approbation of the totalitarian traditions from which the communist system sprouted. On the contrary, he sought to restore those traditions of liberal democracy and reformist socialism that were throttled in October 1917 and that today, following the collapse of the communist experiment, warrant the hope that the future Russia will rejoin the family of European nations, in which it will lose nothing of the specific features that Europeanized her in her own fashion. For that matter the Europeanization of any country is of that order, insofar as Europe is the common birthplace of liberal and social democracy, of a Christianity, which while producing totalitarian venom, nevertheless generated an antidote that cured it of the two most appalling totalitarian dictatorships.

Sakharov stands forth as a symbol of the Europeanized Russia of the future. His contribution thereto is multifaceted; it is intellectual, moral and political. He stands forth as a symbol of the already living Russia that, like him, demonstrates grit, wisdom and courage, in that the hopes entertained are coming true.

VENICE

He rejected violence in principle

Returning to Sakharov's legacy

Andrei Kozyrev,
Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation

Andrei Sakharov was one of the first to understand that the real lever capable of bringing the mad world back to normal is concern not for the purity of ideological views or military strategic advantages, but for the individual. Persistently fighting against ideological uniformity, he was not afraid of publicly declaring that the defence of human rights had become a universal ideology uniting men and women of all nationalities and various beliefs.

The academician continued to defy the regime even in exile. "I have learned about the scale and cynicism with which civil and political rights are violated in the USSR, including the right to the freedom of belief and information, the right to a free choice of the country of residence (that is, to emigration and return), the choice of the place of residence within the country, the right to an impartial trial and defence in court, the right to the freedom of religion."

Let us remember this list. Many of the above-mentioned violations are becoming a thing of the past. But the cause for which Sakharov fought is far from being completed. I would like to remind you of the axiom expressed by Sakharov and conclusively proved by experience: a society in which these rights are not observed is "closed" and potentially dangerous to mankind and is doomed to degradation. Let us once more think over Sakharov's appeal – to fight for human rights by means of glasnost, rejecting violence in principle.

The individual was the only scale from which Sakharov viewed both Soviet and global problems of today. Not a few messianic schemes and bellicose doctrines are based on the suppression of the individual for the sake of "most advanced" classes, nations or beliefs. The dogmatic "isms" have invariably led peoples to tragedies. The results of man's penetration into the mysteries of nature, be it the atomic nucleus or outer space, have become a source of global danger.

Sakharov's vital thesis about the indissoluble connection between international security and trust, the observance of human rights and the openness of society has been doubly confirmed in the past years – through the adverse effects of the cold war inseparably linked with the paranoidal "besieged fortress" psychology, and through the initial positive achievements of glasnost and democratization which have opened the way to the strengthening of international trust.



Drawing by Igor Kopelnitsky (Israel)

The hard road of a prophet

Like many other people in our society, Sakharov has covered a hard road towards enlightenment. It is probably not accidental that the creative genius of the physicist was directed into the militarized sector which continues to occupy a disproportionately large and economically onerous place in our economy.

Later on the academician would vaguely assess his part in the creation of the Soviet Union's nuclear might. On the one hand, the development of the nuclear weapon was justified, because it counteracted, so to speak, the possession of an analogous superweapon by another great power. It was justified to the extent to which it was necessary from the standpoint of normal interests of the great power. On the other hand, not a few doubts arose in view of the special character of the system dominant in the Soviet state. However, the realization of the wicked nature of this system and the internal and external threat created by it came later. At first, there arose a pacifist negation of the weapon of mass annihilation.

Sakharov's concrete, not abstract humanism was soon manifested in the character of this negation. Concern for the right to life, and then about all other rights of the individual, could be seen behind talk about salvation of mankind, talk important in itself but not enough for real politics. Hundreds, if not thousands of career politicians, journalists and even "people's diplomats" spent their lives comfortably in the safe "fight for peace and against the nuclear threat."

Transferring concern for the security of mankind to individuals whom the system tried for decades to turn into cogwheels of the Soviet machinery of state, Sakharov inevitably came to know victims of labour camps and mental homes for dissidents, the endless ordeals and humiliation of "refuseniks," and the persecution of those champions of peace who dared talk about two parties in the arms race. As a result, he became an outcast.

One must have stoic belief in one's conscience and the people to hold out against pressure and slander. The fact that millions of Soviet people regarded and regard the attitude to Sakharov's ideas as a genuine criterion of political integrity remains a convincing warning for those who would like to restore the old law and order. It is simultaneously the best argument for optimists who, despite all the complications, believe in a democratic future. No wonder that

today, as five years ago, Gorbachev's phone call to Sakharov asking the dissident academician to work jointly for the cause of democratization remains a symbolic point on which the sharp political struggle in our society is focused.

The romanticism of concrete deeds...

As distinct from the usual recipes for general happiness, the universal ideology of the defence of human rights is not a refuge from reality or a means of violence over life. Its essence lies in a consistent orientation on universal human values, not at the declarative but at the concrete level of interests of individuals, concrete peoples and states.

It is often said that Sakharov was a romantic and out of touch with reality, though deserving high respect for his quixotism. The same is also said today about another Russian prophet of the 20th century, Alexander Solzhenitsyn, who proposed a way of saving Russia from its imperial and totalitarian syndromes and bringing it back to democracy no matter how complex and contradictory this process might be.

This is a reaction of the alienation of man blinded ideologically and intolerant of everything which is not allowed by the high superiors, of the human type aptly described as "homo Sovieticus." Today we can note a peculiar subspecies – "homo democraticus" who has replaced the set of ideological incantations of the past by democratic phraseology. These "impatient doctors" offer quick-acting drugs which, as Sakharov aptly remarked, are more dangerous than the disease itself. They have the same distinctive features, namely, non-professinalism and reluctance to pay heed to a competent advice.

Our country has paid dearly for improvization in politics. Any policy, even more honest in its trend, ought not to be carried out rashly and intuitively. Otherwise it can easily turn into its opposite. Andrei Sakharov stressed more than once that one should act skilfully, resist the temptation of conformism and defend human rights and glasnost by socially important means.

...and realistic radicalism

Ten years before perestroika began Sakharov noted that by virtue of its immanent stability, inertness, fear and passivity, totalitarian socialism represents a sort of historical dead-end siding from which it is hard to get out. A determined effort is needed therefore. If we go with the stream, Sakharov said at the concluding sitting of the First Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR, cherishing hopes for gradual changes for the better in a distant future, the growing tension can explode our society with most tragic consequences.

I think that the rejection of the 500 days programme by the central government is one of the most conclusive proofs of this warning. If the agreement in principle between President Gorbachev and the leaders of nine republics is not embodied in coordinated actions to carry out a radical economic reform, we shall once again pay for non-professionalism and dilly-dallying.

I hope we have enough political realism and will to implement Sakharov's ideas in the society we shall ultimately build. Here are only some of his thoughts which are still relevant today as primary tasks:

– the army must not be a political force in any country; there is always a great danger if the army emerges in the political scene independently; the danger is lessened to some extent if the defence minister is a civilian; the main thing is to reduce the probability of military coups;

– the functions of the KGB must be limited to the defence of the country's international security;

– direct tandem elections after the US model;

– perestroika is a movement towards pluralism, for otherwise it is not perestroika at all but mere words;

– we must act in a way to help Gorbachev move along the road of perestroika and, to the best of our ability, make a shift to the right impossible; the assessment of the personality of Gorbachev does not matter here; we must do only what is historically necessary at present;

– the basic and priority right of every nation and republic is the right to self-determination; a republic shall join the Union ...under the Treaty of Union, in accordance with the will of the population of a republic expressed in a decision of its supreme legislative body.

Unity through multiformity

Genuine humanism embraces the world as a single whole with the diversity of languages, images, historical traditions, national features, mass and individual beliefs and notions. The small and large nations of the Soviet Union are organically linked with the common destiny of civilization. This also applies to the Russian people, who "bear the main burden of great-power ambitions and the consequences of adventurism and dogmatism in foreign and home policy."

Totalitarian socialism, which stirred up hostility towards the surrounding world, cultivated the worst features of the people, including the servile spirit combined with disdain for foreigners, aliens and heterodoxes. This spirit, which existed in Russia for centuries, was regarded by Sakharov as the worst evil, not an indication of the national health. The people's character capable of a reasonable existence in an ever more complex world, Sakharov stressed, can be moulded only in democratic conditions, the more so as Russia had not a few democratic accomplishments in its history.

Genuine realism is far from a non-critical attitude to the other system. Sakharov more than once pointed to the West's shortcomings, though he recognized its great achievements in the building of pluralist democracy.

An appropriate conclusion was drawn: the ways of the social progress of peoples and states converge on observance of the civilized standards of democratic development, renunciation of violence as a means of settling political, ideological and other disputes. The national and other features of the people of a given country do not disappear in such a development. On the contrary, each nation reveals its own unique identity, without counterposing itself to other nations but together with them. Hence the historic purport of the task of overcoming the closed and uncivilized character of the society on one-sixth of the earth's land. In spite of all difficulties we are bound to succeed, following Sakharov's behest, we shall identify perestroika with pluralism and pluralism with convergence.

Prison and freedom

Human rights movement at the crossroads

Valery Abramkin,
head of the Public centre for assisting the humanization of the penitentiary system

In the 1960s-80s the human rights organizations concentrated their attention on the violation of such human rights as freedom of emigration, speech, conscience and so on. This was, above all, because we worked in conditions of rigid information blockade and, naturally, could not have a comprehensive picture of the scope, structure and nature of human rights violations in the USSR. Now this blockade has been broken but work in the human rights sphere continues in old directions, as if the new ones did not exist. Although in reality old directions are nothing but small rivulets in the common avalanche of human rights violations. In our society there are a number of social institutions with mass-scale gross violations of human rights, where the rights of the so-called first group, i.e., those enumerated in the Declaration of Human Rights, are infringed upon. These are, above all, the right to live, to inviolability of a person, ban on slavery, on keeping a person in captivity, ban on tortures or punishments humiliating human dignity. And only after that the document enumerates the rights to the freedom of travel, thinking, conscience and religion. I think that the enumeration of human rights by the Declaration in such an order is not fortuitous.

Of course, human rights must be fully observed. It is also obvious that tortures, inhuman treatment and the situation under which human life itself is endangered make other rights superfluous. And it is precisely the rights of the first group that are being violated in our prisons, armies, children's homes and homes for the disabled.

Institutions for extrajudicial punishments are still existing in the **penitentiary system**. Experiments which continue up to this day were staged in GULAG some 30 years ago. For example, we know that there are at least 8 "White Swans" in the country today. These are prisons which adopted their slangy name from the first institution of this kind situated in Solikamsk, Perm region. These are centralized institutions to which the so-called "Otritsalovo" – a contingent of the least controllable prisoners – are sent. These are not the most dangerous but the least controllable criminals. By the way, the most dangerous ones are usually controlled very well, even helping the administration to deal with the "Otritsalovo."

Under the law now in force the violators of the camp regime must be placed in the so-called cell-type premises (CTP) on the camp territory. Some 10 years ago the CTP in camps, under authority of the Main administration of lumbering corrective-labour institutions were turned into separate establishments – in fact prisons. Their aim was to isolate the "Otritsalovo" from the less active majority of prisoners and break their resistance by any means. From the legal point of view the law is obviously violated here: people sentenced to serve a term in a colony are subjected to a much more severe punishment – imprisonment. As for the conditions under which inmates are held in the "White Swans," it's better not to speak about them because the unruly are subjected to reprisals there.

On the whole, the use of such punishments as straitjackets and self-tightening hand-cuffs must be abolished in the penitentiary system. The rather wide-scale use of these punishments today runs counter to the Basic Standardized Rules of treatment of prisoners, which our government pledged to abide by.

Today it is senseless to seek complete abolition of forced labour in camps – no person in our country will do it. But it is necessary at least to cancel punishments for the refusal to work for women who have babies at children's homes in colonies, for pregnant women, for the first and second group invalids and for minors. From 50,000 to 60,000 prisoners of these categories are kept in camps and prisons. Such an abolition won't call for any particular state budget expenditures. But society will at least be rid of one of the most striking signs of slavery.



Drawing by Leonid Tishkov

In the **army**, according to the special commission of the USSR Supreme Soviet, set up after the Decree of the President, 120,000 servicemen perished over the past 15 years. Except for the victims of hostilities, inter-ethnic conflicts and mishaps, all others perished in the barracks as a result of murder and suicides. The commission stated that about 80 percent of deaths are the result of "hazing," i.e., executions, brutal tortures and humiliation of people.

A group of independent sociologists, headed by Sergei Belanovsky, has been engaged in investigations on this subject for three years. Among other things it checked the cases on the death of soldiers: only 4 out of 96 judgements of the Military Procurator's Office and the Military Tribunal were recognized as well-grounded. Who can control the situation with the soldiers' rights? The local authorities on whose territory the military unit is stationed have no such opportunity. Nobody will allow them to enter the territory of the unit...

Horrible things are happening in **orphanages**. Below is the information received by Yelena Armand – participant in the human rights movement back in the 1960s. She used to work in a special boarding school for children who cannot cope with the school programme. According to Yelena Armand, the situation there is tragic because quite normal children, neglected by teachers, get into those institutions where they are crippled. There is a whole system of turning normal children, who can be saved – and they make up the majority there – into sheer idiots. More than that, disobedient and active children, who run away from these boarding schools saving themselves from beatings and torture (a normal child's behaviour) are sent to mental hospitals. Until recently they were given strong psychotropic medicines there. If these children continue to show "disobedience," they get to a home for the disabled, walk, still alive, into non-existence, from where there is no way out. What's more, no serious psychiatric expert examination is conducted. As a rule, the victims are the children left whithout protection, i.e., who either have no parents or whose parents are drunkards.

We have no mechanism for the protection of children's rights. There are commissions for minors, which punish parents and children. But they do not protect children's rights.

In the 1960s-70s, i.e., in conditions of the information blockade, the problem of human rights in our country was dealt with more fruitfully. For example, the Helsinki group annually prepared dozens of documents, among them those summarizing the situation with human rights in one sphere or another. And all this at a time when arrests went on continually and the number of the group members steadily decreased... Now apart from the Helsinki group there is a committee in the Supreme Soviet of Russia, a human rights subcommittee in the USSR Supreme Soviet and many other committees on human rights. So what? At least I haven't come across a single summarizing document on the observance of human rights in the USSR.

Meanwhile, the view became widespead in the West that progress has been achieved in this sphere in our country. But where from can they learn about the real situation when we don't speak about it?

I think the time has come to revise the whole conception of the activity of human rights organizations. I back the idea of creating a human rights research centre, which former political prisoner Alexei Smirnov is now trying to materialize.

The human rights activity is as necessary today as 10 or 15 years ago. It is necessary to demand all information connected with the observance of human rights. Today the commission on "hazing" set up by the President cannot get such information, the officials do not obey them. And there is no law on freedom of information. What can be said about specialists who need such information for work? The information published in the press is a flagrant lie. For example, it is claimed that there are 750,000 people imprisoned in the USSR. As we managed to learn, this figure does not include the people kept in investigation cells, serving the term at harmful productions, special clinics for alcoholics, disciplinary battalions, in special mental hospitals. In world practice the number of prisoners includes all people whose freedom is restricted in one way or another. By our estimates there are about 1.5 million such people in the USSR. ■

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Should drugs become a part of our life?

Leonid Ionin

"Drugs are evil." The truth of this affirmation is doubtful. After all, drugs are chemical compounds, natural or synthesized, and they can be made "evil" or "good" only through involvement in the world of human goals and values.

One can give another formulation: the use of drugs is an evil. But even this seemingly "more veracious" affirmation is not absolutely true either. The notions of evil and good are relative. The predilection of people for drugs is a boon for drug dealers and drug producers. In many countries of Asia and South America cultivation of poppy and hemp is the requisite condition for the survival of a huge number of peasant families.

The use of drugs is not necessarily an evil for the user himself. There is a great distance between the use of drugs and drug addiction – the psychosomatic disease. Most people who have been using drugs in the past or are using them now never travel that distance to the end. In other words, they never reach that fatal point beyond which the passion for the drug becomes an alien force that in a way breaks a person's will from the outside.

Then we are left with the following wording: drug abuse is an evil. Being milder, this formula does not put the drugs *per se* "under a cloud," and despite its seeming tautology creates a possibility for the elaboration of a new strategy of combatting drugs.

What does the traditional strategy amount to? It amounts to the struggle precisely against **drugs** and the **use of drugs.** The word "strategy" can be used here in its direct sense – military strategy. Reports from the fronts – from Bolivia, the Golden Triangle and the Central Asian republics of the USSR – look rather impressive. Newspapers are bringing news about the victories of cutoms officials on the boundless spaces of the Northern Hemisphere – in Toronto, Frankfort on the Main, New York and Moscow.

But if one gives it a thought, no less impressive is the futility of these victories. For the greater the victory, the bigger is the scale of drug business. If ten to twenty years ago a kilo of hashish was considered to be a decent trophy, today they are talking about tons of hashish. Victories turn into defeats: no sooner do they block completely one route of drug transportation than another one comes into existence. The victory over narcobusiness in one country is immediately followed by a couple of other countries embarking on the dangerous path. The market fills in the gap. The bottom line of all these battles: the number of drug users and the volume of the drugs used are invariably on the rise.

What else is on the rise? The number of the police officers combatting drug abuse. The money allocated from public funds for combatting drugs. The risk of drug dealers and drug suppliers, of course, also increases which is naturally reflected in the prices going up too. If everything goes well, superprices guarantee a superprofit. As a consequence, the number of those who would like to try their luck increases. All this resembles the process of the snowball formation.

But the worst thing is the growth of the so-called "secondary" crime connected with getting money for drugs. A drug itself does not push one to commit a crime. One commits a crime because he needs money to buy drugs. And the more strict and inexorable is the state in its persecution, punishment and outlawing of those who use drugs, the more they become alienated from society and entangled in the net stretched out by the underground dealers without any hope for freeing themselves.

All this sad reality is based on an unshakeable premise according to which a drug is an evil, and the use of drugs is an evil. Is there any way out of this vicious circle?

I shall not be very original if I say that the way out is in "joining" drugs to society. Instead of putting those who use drugs in the position of criminals and social outcasts, society must work out socially acceptable ways of "maintaining contacts" with the drugs that could be tolerable both for the law and the people living next to drug users.

Acceptable and tolerable does not mean approved and encouraged. The difference can be demonstrated by the following example. The use of alcohol (and this is one of the most widespread drugs) is not encouraged or approved by society. Many countries ban advertising alcoholic drinks. Practically everywhere in the world there exist certain restrictions on the age of liquor buyers and the time and places of its selling. And yet at the same time the consumption of alcohol is acceptable and tolerable. It has been introduced into the "context" of social existence: there are certain customs, conventions and tacit understandings as to what, how, when, where and how much one can drink and how he should behave when drinking. Society has also formulated conceptions of alcohol abuse and the ways of combatting it with the help of legislative, administrative and educational measures.

Such social regulation is much more effective than any struggle for the complete eradication of a phenomenon. It has become clear, to boot, that it is impossible to eradicate what has been rooting itself in mankind's flesh for millenniums on end. After all, drugs are as old as mankind itself. And the history of numerous dead and living civilizations, the history of religions and art is, besides everything else, the history of acquired habits, methods and ways of life with drugs and not the struggle for their eradication.

Wine used to be an evil too. This is exactly how it was regarded times and again. Yet people have learned how to drink wine and even began to glorify it. And after all, scarlet poppies are no less poetic than vine.

The revolution continues till restoration of the old order

The funeral of seamen killed during the Kronstadt mutiny in 1921. A warning to the Bolsheviks

Leonid Luks,
West German political scientist

The New Economic Policy (NEP) launched in Russia in March 1921 was one of the few attempts to overhaul the Soviet system. No wonder that after perestroika had been started the Soviet advocates of reforms paid close attention to that period, trying to find stimuli for the renewal of the present regime.

At the first stage of perestroika, till the peaceful revolution of 1989 in Eastern Europe which ousted Communists from power, especially much attention was given to a communist alternative to the Stalin administrative-command system. The champions of perestroika dreamed of "communism with a human face." In this connection the programme of Nikolai Bukharin, one of the chief proponents of the NEP was extensively mentioned in articles devoted to perestroika.

In 1988, when the Soviet public marked the centenary of the birth of this political leader, removed by Stalin from power and executed in 1938, one could observe a sort of Bukharin renaissance. In the opinion of many people, this associate of Lenin's embodied the bright and "soft" trend of Bolshevism, as distinct from Stalin, who embodied doctrinairism and terrorism. The administrative-command system created by Stalin on the ruins of the NEP in the 1930s was described by Soviet champions of reforms as a revival of the system of "war communism" which was propped up by "red terror" during the civil war.

Reforms carried out as "revolutions from above" have their internal logic

In the opinion of some authors, the struggle between War Communism and the NEP runs through Soviet history. War Communism is an attempt forcibly to adapt the society to the Bolshevist doctrine while the NEP is an attempt to adapt the doctrine to the realities of life.

Principles and power

In fact, the Bolsheviks constantly vacillated between the two poles and not infrequently they survived thanks to their ability to change the policy drastically when the circumstances required. An

example of such a change is the proclamation of the NEP in March 1921, designed to replace the policy of War Communism.

During the period of War Communism (1918–1921) the Bolsheviks thought that they were about to attain their communist goal. The industry and banks had been nationalized and private trade abolished, and economic management had been centralized. The peasants were under the heel of "food dictatorship" which forced them to deliver their "surpluses" to the state. Sometimes the whole harvest was taken away. Only the state could produce and distribute the wealth and use manpower. Money lost its value. It seemed that the capitalist system had been finally overcome.

In these circumstances most Bolsheviks regarded the transition from War Communism to the NEP, the basic principles of which were formulated by Lenin at the tenth congress of the Communist Party, as a rather painful defeat. Some party members compared the NEP with the humiliating Brest peace concluded in March 1918. Lenin then relinquished part of the territory to gain time for saving the regime. In 1921 critics reproached Lenin with sacrificing socialist principles in order to get a respite.

It was not easy for Lenin, one of the authors of the policy of War Communism, to give up the "socialist gains" achieved during the civil war. His political behaviour revealed the same contradiction as the policy of the party founded by him. A dogmatist divorced from reality constantly fought in him against a sober-minded politician aspiring to power.

As a politician defending power, Lenin understood in 1921 that the Bolsheviks could achieve much more by way of concessions than by dogmatic obstinacy. The vast majority of the population saw no rationale for the continuation of the terrorist policy of War Communism after the Bolsheviks' victory in the civil war (the end of 1920). The peasants' resistance to this policy grew everywhere. In several regions peasant riots assumed the scale of civil war.

The last warning to the Bolsheviks was the mutiny of Kronstadt seamen which broke out on March 1, 1921. From 1917 Kronstadt was the most reliable bastion of the revolution. For four years in succession its seamen fought on all fronts of the civil war. After the victory in the civil war "the most reliable bastion of the revolution" rose against the Bolsevist dictatorship in the name of Soviet democracy. The seamen wrote in their address to the population: "By carrying out the October revolution the working class hoped to achieve its emancipation. As a result, the individual was enslaved greater still. It became evident that the Russian Communist Party is not a champion of the working people, as it posed. The interests of the working people are alien to it. Having seized power, it fears only to lose it. Here, in Kronstadt, the first stone of a third revolution has been laid."

During the mutiny Lenin declared that tyrannical measures in the economy were justified only during the civil war. Now that the civil war was over the continuation of the old policy was impossible. It was rejected by the majority of the population, first of all peasants. For this reason the Bolshevik government ought to make as many concessions as possible to the discontented masses in order to win their support again.

At the same time he enunciated the main principles of the NEP. The essence of it was the abolition of the food surplus-requisitioning system. The peasants were now required only to pay their tax in kind and could again sell food surpluses on the free market. The NEP also lifted restrictions on private economic initiative in several other sectors. Many of the enterprises nationalized during the period of War Communism were privatized. The only exception was heavy industry. All enterprises remained under state control in this branch.

One of the results of the NEP was a swift restoration of Russian agriculture. In 1920 agricultural output made up only a quarter of the 1913 figure, and in 1925 it already reached the prewar level. Peasant riots, a widespread phenomenon in 1921, virtually ended in 1922.

Internal party disputes

At the early stage of perestroika, when the struggle against Stalinism was waged with the help of Leninism, writers paid much attention to a change in Lenin's policy in 1921. Many of them pointed out that, as distinct from Stalin, Lenin could openly admit his own mistakes. He did not embellish the country's disastrous condition in 1921. Stalin behaved differently in similar situations.

Indeed, the creation of a false picture of the situation in which the reality was turned upside down could definitely be regarded as Stalin's "contribution" to the development of Bolshevism. The advocates of Lenin forgot one circumstance, however. Though the founder of the Soviet state could indeed criticize himself, he was simultaneously convinced that only the Bolsheviks had the right to correct their own mistakes. Hence changes in the policy which happened so often in the history of the Soviet regime and where equivalent to a change of government. The survival of one-party dictatorships depends on whether they can oppose themselves, so to speak, in critical situations.

Lenin had this ability and, therefore, did not consider it necessary to make concessions to a real, genuine opposition. The annunciation of the NEP was immediately followed by the banning of the Menshevik and Socialist Revolutionary parties, the last legal political groups which remained in Russia together with the Bolsheviks. Any political activity outside the Bolshevik Party was strictly banned. Only the Bolsheviks, the "vanguard of the working class," could play the "leading role" in all important political organizations: the Soviets, trade unions and so on.

Lenin categorically rejected the attempts of some communists, the "Workers' Opposition," for instance, to withdraw these organizations from under party control or even control them with the help of the party from without. He branded attempts of this kind as survivals of anarchist-syndicalist thinking in Bolshevism. As a result, the party, which had about 470,000 members in 1924 (when Lenin died), represented the only political subject in the vast empire.

This explains why the ideological discussions which tore the party in the 1920s were of vital importance for the country's destiny. The discussions centred on the NEP. Among its most virulent critics were left Communists led by Lev Trotsky, who believed that the building of the socialist economy and industrialization could be achieved only by an intensified exploitation of peasants.

This idea was formulated most clearly in 1924 by Yevgeny Preobrazhensky,

The New Economic Policy was easily smothered. A warning to reformers?

who shared Trotsky's views. Funds for industrialization of the Soviet Union, he said, can be found only by reducing the living standards of the Russian rural population. Preobrazhensky held that the peasants should become a sort of internal colony for the Soviet government.

Views of this kind were flatly dismissed by advocates of the NEP, first of all Nikolai Bukharin, who unfailingly stressed that in the context of Russia industry could be built only on the basis of flourishing agriculture. In 1925 he called on the Russian peasants to enrich themselves, thereby stirring up angry protests from the lefts. For them the Bukharin programme signified restoration of capitalism in Russia.

Stalin, who was elected general secretary of the Russian Communist Party in April 1922, initially supported the Bukharin line. Most party members considered the "left danger" the main threat to the regime. At the 15th party congress in December 1927 the lefts were completely deprived of power, and right after that Stalin and his faction changed the policy drastically. In July 1928 he adopted Preobrazhensky's view by stating that the industrialization of Russia could be financed only by reducing the living standards of the rural population. The peasants had to pay a sort of contribution. This would surely meet with resistance on the part of peasants, primarily rich peasants. But, as Stalin pointed out, the dying classes never surrender without struggle.

History repeats itself

It became clear that during the "soft" years of the NEP Bolshevism did not give up its bellicosity of the period of War Communism. Its voluntarist utopian energy did not fade. It was to this energy that Stalin appealled. He knew that Bukharin's pro-peasant policy was not popular among the majority of Bolsheviks. It seemed to doom the party to inactivity, adaptation to the most primitive forces of the Russian society. This contradicted Lenin's concept of the party as the vanguard which must implement and even impose its will on the people.

Bukharin earnestly warned the party against the disastrous consequences of a deviation from the NEP. Stalin intends to restore the military feudal exploitation of Russian peasants, he said at a plenum of the party's central committee in January 1929. For its security, Bukharin went on, the Soviet Union needs the trust of peasants much more than the founding of heavy industry, for in the event of a war the passivity and especially hostility of the masses can be extremely dangerous for the regime. Twelve years later, when the Red Army retreated under the pressure of the German offensive, this warning acquired special urgency.

The public did not learn about Bukharin's dramatic appeals. The discussion on the party's new general line and therefore on the country's future proceeded almost exclusively within the higher echelons of the party. The public learned about a split within the leadership only after the official condemnation of the Bukharin faction at the 16th party conference in April 1929. In this way the Russian peasants lost the last defenders within the ruling elite. The way to the expropriation of 100 million peasants was open.

The easiness with which the opponents of the NEP put an end to it is today interpreted by many advocates of perestroika as a warning. In the face of growing tendencies towards restoring the old order the attention of news analysts is increasingly drawn to causes of the failure of the NEP rather than to its sources. One can see more clearly the shortcomings of this policy, first of all the failure to protect the newly introduced mechanisms of a market economy by standards of a law-based state from above and social autonomy from below. Formal obstacles to the arbitrary rule of the state were not put even after 1921. That is why in 1929, when the internal alignment of forces had changed, the ruling elite could return to the doctrinaire policy without obstruction and do away with the NEP.

The future of the country and its people is in danger if it depends on the alignment of forces in the higher echelons. This alignment is unstable and changeable as long as the democratic mechanisms of legality, electivity, glasnost and responsibility do not work. This observation refers to the sad end of Khrushchev's policy of reforms. However, it can well be applied to the NEP and Gorbachev's perestroika. The recurring scenarios show that the reforms carried out as "revolutions from above" have their internal logic. They quickly go over to the restoration of the old order if changes begin to create even the slightest threat to the interests of the ruling hierarchy.

Back home ... to the GULAG

Dmitry Alexandrovich Bystroletov was born at the turn of the century into the family of Count Alexander Nikolaevich Tolstoy. He was tutored at home as was the custom in aristocratic families after which he attended the St.Petersburg school of naval cadets. Next came the First World War, the two revolutions, the Civil War and a period in emigration. In 1925 he was recruited as a Soviet agent abroad and five years later acquired professional status in the Soviet illegal intelligence in Europe. For seven of his twelve years as spy he masqueraded as a ruined Hungarian count, an English lord, and a swindler with a Greek passport. Though exposed to dangerous risk he secured precious intelligence, including diplomatic codes.

In the second half of the 1930s, when secret service staffs were cruelly repressed and some intelligence officers preferred to stay abroad, he unhesitatingly returned to the USSR. Crippled by torture — ribs and skull were cracked — he finally signed faked testimony and was sentenced to 20 years in the Gulag.

In 1954 he was invalided out before the end of his term. In 1956 he was reinstated and in early 1968 finished a 12-volume collection of reminiscences entitled *Feast of the Immortals*.

In 1968, in my official capacity I was asked to review a story that Bystroletov had written. To my professional eye, it seemed a highly incredible adventure tale. However, in the archives I found full evidence of the events described, which showed that the writer was an extraordinary person.

We arranged to meet at an undercover apartment. A tall, grey-haired old man entered the sitting room with slow step — earlier he had had several strokes. His whiskers and flowing beard failed to hide the gentle smile reflected, however in a somewhat cautious manner, in his blue eyes.

Sensing my interest in his previous experiences and realizing that he could speak frankly without violating the basic principles of intelligence, he spent several hours telling the story of his youth, of the poverty and humiliation suffered in emigration, of the dangers and twists and turns of spying, of the tortures suffered in prison, and of his struggle for survival in the Gulag.

Nevertheless, he showed no trace of anger. "My work as spy took up the best years of my life and I am proud of it. I am glad that I returned to the USSR, even though I ran the risk of death," he wrote. "However, I returned of my own volition as a patriot. I think I have led a good life and would be prepared to live such a life once again."

Freed from the Gulag, Bystroletov failed to rake up any sympathy from the chiefs of the secret service, who were busy reorganizing after Berla was shot. They merely extended cold condolences, gave him a miserable invalid pension and a small room in a shared apartment. Only after we met in 1968 was interest shown in his experience as spy and the KGB helped to have him provided with a separate flat.

His recollections are to be features in the journal *Pogranichnik* (Borderguard) and to be brought out under separate cover by the Granitsa (Frontier) publishing house.

Col. *Georgy Sokolov*

Dmitry Bystroletov

The jeep in which I was seated sandwiched between two Chekists raced along the Leningradsky Highway from the Sokol settlement to Dzerzhinsky Square. I peered at the pink clouds overhead, as the cold bright autumn day broke. None of the Moscovites hurrying to work had any inkling that ferried past in this jeep was an innocent arrested Soviet citizen who paradoxically enough, was inordinately happy!

Why was I so happy at this terrible time? Because the stress of the expectation of an inevitable arrest was over!

I had been living in a new house, built by the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs partly for staff workers who spent much of their time away on long trips primarily abroad. Over the last few months cars drive up to the house, as soon as darkness fell, and people were taken away under arrest. Next morning the caretaker climbed on to a stool to black out the names of the arrested on the list of residents, which according to the rules were displayed at every entrance then. Only later they were removed

At the beginning it was people I hardly knew, but working in the Foreign Department of the NKVD's Chief Directorate for State Security, where I too was employed, who were arrested. Back home I shrugged and wondered in conversations with my wife: "Whence so many traitors and spies?" Later, all my previous superiors and comrades disappeared one after another, while I was transferred to a civilian office, the Chamber of Commerce, which true did have some dealings with foreign countries. Even there needed, tried and tested workers, experienced veterans were arrested one after another, quite plainly in line with some plan...

My wife bundled up some warm clothes for me adding spoon and bowl, and also some sugar and butter. Each night we fell asleep only at daybreak. We kept jumping appear and rushing towards the windows to look out between the curtains...

We spent practically the entire night by the window, waiting for the motorcars to start up and dark figures to slip out from the house entrance. As the patch of deadened light crept across the wall, everything would quietened down until the new night.

Now this horrible nightmare was suddenly over.

"You'll be using a crowbar"

In Lubianka I was locked into a cubicle even a bit more cramped than a telephone booth. I heard

the NKVD men speaking to one another as they examined the loot.

"These suits are grand."

"Sure, right you are."

"Let me have that there leather jacket, to try on!".

"Take it off, you bastard, you'll split the seams! And give it to me, it's my fit."

For an instance there shot to mind the shop in Regent Street, London, where I had bought that jacket. True that was hard to believe now.

"A swell hanky, Ivan, ain't it? Just you look."



Dmitry Bystroletov prior to arrest and in the evening of his life

I was next led through narrow corridors and shoved into a small windowless cell with four cots. A shaven-headed man in a black padded jacket, padded trousers and crude highboots sat on one of the cots. We shook hands and introduced ourselves.

"What, never heard my name before?" the man was astonished. "I was chief of construction in Norilsk. What, never heard of that place either? Going up there is a huge plant and a township for some 150.000 residents. After your trial, you might be dispatched there if not shot."

"What on earth for?"

The man emitted a lopsided grin.

"To slave away there, my dear foreigner. You'll be putting on a padded jacket and using a crowbar to crack open the permafrost."

"Nonsense!" I shrugged. "I'm not to blame for anything. Evidently you were arrested for some serious came, and will be given a harsh sentence. But it's different with me, they'll just throw a scare into me, check my credentials, realize that I'm innocent and let me out. In the Soviet Union nobody is condemned if innocent. This is no capitalist country."

The man in black muttered through his teeth:

"You mean to say I'm guilty and you aren't? You dirty dog!"

He rose, and so did I.

"I don't advise you to use that kind of tone towards me. I'll have you know I'm quite good with my fists."

His lips quivered. I took out a pack of American cigarettes, lit one for myself and offered him another. The former construction chief heaved a heavy sigh.

"Nobody's let out here! As you've been working abroad and have now been arrested, that means that you'll either be shot or given a long term. For what, you want to know? For having been abroad, and knowing too much. You'll be sent far away. Your life's over! Just like mine, just like thousands upon thousands of white slaves at the Norilsk construction site. The Tundra'll soon get you down, even should you not be shot."

A grey day began. I was taken to the reception department for the arrested to be frisked, fill in forms, be photographed, fingerprinted, washed, to have my head shaven, and take a medical check. I submitted to everything with complete indifference. I was sure I would soon return home. However, I did demonstrate some caution and in the line denoting profession, wrote "lawyer," not adding "doctor." From Pogodin's play *The Aristocrats*, I thought I could find work as a lawyer at the construction site, because as far as I had grasped, prison doctors were on the official payroll. Moreover, people with two professions were rare, envied and not trusted.

I punctually discharged all the formalities and went back to the cell rather unwillingly, as my cellmate gabbed endlessly about camp life. "He's afraid for himself and I suppose for good reason," I thought indifferently examining his yellowish, haggard visage.

What Chekhov's three sisters wished for

For nearly thirteen years I had worked abroad as an employee of the Foreign Affairs Department of the NKVD's Chief Directorate for State Security. Recruited when on the stuff of the commercial legation in Prague, I made believe as if I was going back to Moscow and went underground as a professional spy. I had no wish to join the Party while abroad, all the more the staff of the Chief Directorate for State Security. I wrote several books, which I hoped to see published in Moscow, also prepared black-and-white drawings for an exhibition, and on my last visit joined the Union of Soviet Artists. I made a good spy as I was communicable and fluent in several foreign languages. Still I thought this all would be temporary, and like Chekhov's three sisters, dreamed of getting to Moscow. Simultaneously I graduated from two university departments and visited many countries. "For discharging a major mission of immense significance" I was awarded a revolver with my name on it. Later I volunteered to stay on all alone in a country where a major source had been uncovered and from which all other members of the underground group had been recalled home. I was successful.

I was promised that I would be recalled to Moscow, would be decorated with an order, and could retire and live at home and do what I pleased. I brought home background material for two books and also 50 pictures, mostly from Africa.

However, told that one must undergo personal sacrifice in these difficult times, I was given a new mission to go with my wife as a Dutchman to Dutch India, buy a plantation there, join the local pro-fascist party, then move to South America, where to join the local branch of the Nazi party and eventually wind up in Europe, where in the event of war against Germany, I would serve as link with a major source on the German general staff.

"Stalin and the Homeland will never forget you"

In my presence, Slutsky, chief of the Foreign Department, reported on the subject to People's Commissar Yezhov. He listened attentively, picked up a blue pencil and scrawled across the first page: "Approved. Yezhov." He then added:

"We're giving you a top source. Appreciate that. You'll be in the cadre and have a military rank. Apply to join the Party. No need to give thought to your mother, we'll take care of her. Calmly go abroad. Remember that Stalin and the Homeland will never forget you. Good luck!"

He hugged me, kissed on the cheeks three times in Russian style, and away I went excited and enthusiastic.

... Subsequently arrest followed arrest. Slutsky met a mysterious death. Colonel Gursky, chief of the section to which I was attached, was arrested, as were my two chiefs abroad – Bazarov and Mali. Undercover agents were recalled and arrested. The best, most gifted and bravest were snatched. I anticipated my turn and, finally, the fatal day came...

Lefortovo, where Bystroletov's ribs and skull were cracked

People's Commissar Yezhov: "Who are you spying for?"

Ink or blood?

As morning came, the door slammed discharging back into the cell prisoners worn down by interrogation.

Some ten days later I was summoned at last, moreover in the daytime, a coincidence which veteran prisoners believed a most favourable sign. I girded myself for the fray, expecting a veteran interrogator with Jesuistic inclinations or a bestial young thug with the instruments of torture in his red hairy paws. However, it proved to be a nice-looking youngster, with no insignia on his collar, a probationer who had still to achieve rank in the Directorate for State Security. He politely asked me to be seated and showed me eleven excerpts from the interrogation sheets of people who had studied during my time in Prague and who had been members of the Prague branch of the Union of Soviet Students of which I had been secretary before joining the commercial legation. All eleven had declared that I had recruited them to work against the Soviet Union and had told them to spy or commit acts of terror. When and where was not clear, as they said I had simply told them to do this and that, nothing more. Only one indicated month and year, and I was glad as I hadn't been in Czecho-Slovakia at that particular time, having returned a month later.

"So I see," the young man indifferently corrected the month.

"How can you correct another person's statements?"

"I can do anything I please," he mumbled and continued reading the novel he held in his hands.

After that he summoned me week after week for a couple of hours and as he continued to read his novel, I languished on the stool before his desk.

"He's just chalking up the hours, which both of you need," a cellmate explained. "He needs them as probationer, and you need them as being under interrogation. Just patiently wait, don't worry and don't rush matters. You'll have your bones broken later in Lefortovo! Because that's not allowed here, in Butyrky.

Accustomed to only daytime summons, I calmly slept nights until once I was unexpectedly summoned at midnight. Now it'll all begin, I thought.

I was prepared.

However, nothing happened. The pleasant young man continued to read his book. Suddenly a squat elderly Chekist with three bars on his collar tub, entered. I took an immediate dislike to him, to his reddish pimply face, his spectacles and his gaping mouth, which reminded one of a toad.

Both young man and I rose.

"Confessing?" the Toad remarked, looking me up and down.

"No," the young man mumbled indifferently.

"How long has he been under interrogation?"

"Three months."

Next night I was again called out, but this time with all my belongings. Some seventy heads turned my way as I went to the door. "He's going to the internal prison!" I heard them whisper.

I was bundled into a Black Maria and taken to the Lubianka, where in a well-furnished room a grey-haired medal-behung man with the pink cheeks of an intellectual lifted his head and mildly explained:

"Today our conversation will be short. For three whole months you've been playing the fool, and it's time you quit that! You'll soon be producing the kind of testimony we need. I've summoned you to inquire what you prefer to write your convessions with, ink or your own blood? Think about it. It's for you to decide, not us. You'll yourself choose what it's to be. If you prefer to use ink, ask to be summoned to the interrogator tomorrow afternoon. You'll be interrogated by the same person and in the same place in Butyrky. But if you prefer to write your confessions in your own blood, then you needn't ask to be summoned, as at midnight you'll be transferred to the military prison in Lefortovo.

First Yezhov's man, and only then Communist

In Butyrky one is led to interrogation thus: the arrested person, with head bowed and hands behind his back, walks along a broad, clean, well-lit red-carpeted corridor. In Lefortovo one is dragged to interrogation: two husky thugs twist the arms back so that head and back bend down and at a run drag the arrested man along an iron balcony and down narrow spiral stairs into a cellar. There they open the door with their boots and shove one onto a chair facing the interrogator's desk. They then

stand to attention like two mastiffs waiting for the interrogator to tell them when they should go to "work".

That was what was fated to happen to me as well.

Having caught my breath, I lifted my head and saw the Toad behind the desk and by his side another young man whose collar bore no insignia, in other words, another practitioner, as like as two peas, to my Butyrky interrogator. Later, glancing at the signatures in the register at the cellar entrance, I found out that the Toad was one Colonel (captain of state security) Solovyov while the practitioner's name was Shukshin.

"Give the bastard a sheet of paper and a pen," the Toad told his assistant. "You fascist mug no doubt know what you're charged with? You're a plotter, a spy, a saboteur and a terrorist. Going to write as stated?"

"No."

"That's just what I thought. You still don't realize that this is the military prison of Lefortovo, not that garbage bin what's called Butyrky. Or that you're going to be interrogated by one of Yezhov's men. Heard about Yezhov? And his hedgehog "mittens"? O, so you have. Seen Boris Yefimov's cartoon in *Pravda?* Saw that the mittens have iron bristles? So you have? Well, I'll have you know that I am first Yezhov's man, and only then a Communist! Yezhov and his men stand above all Communists and non-party people: they're Comrade Stalin's guard and buttress. There's law and redress for everyone in this country, only not for Yezhov's men. We make our own laws and rules, there's no one above us. Only Stalin."

Bloody fists and YCL badges

He got up and came towards me. As he stopped, I froze. The two thugs twisted my arms.

With one deft powerful blow, the Toad knocked out several teeth. I spat them out onto the carpet along with the blood and spit.

He struck again.

I spat out more teeth from the other side of my jaw.

The Toad turned towards me sideways, and with the heels of his boots, began to hit me on the shin bones. It hurt so much, that I didn't even notice when the probationer going down on his knees, took off my shoes.

"Now look, you fascist scum!"

The Toad stamped with his heels on my toes.

"Think that's all? No bloody likely. It's just starting!" The two screws held me between themselves and started beating me so cruelly that everything swam before my eyes; my head wobbled and all I could see were their bloody-stained fists and their YCL badges. They then knocked me off the chair and booted me in the belly.

The acute pain felt fused into one long dull torture. Little by little I seemed to lose consciousness and felt I was just a sack tossed here and there by a powerful machine.

Tired at last, they straightened up, went over to the wash basin and washed the blood off their hands. They splashed long with pleasure.

"Well, going to write?"

I wanted to reply in the negative, but couldn't. My lips were puffed up and I couldn't move them. How could I see properly.

"Alright, that's enough for him today."

The thugs dragged me back to my cot.

The Russian Marat

I started to write the confessions they wanted of me.

During one such interrogation, the door back of me opened, Solovyov jumped, stood to attention and clicked his heels.

"Comrade People's Commissar, the arrested spy Bystroletov is being interrogated by Captain of Sate Security Solovyov."

Yezhov came up to the desk. I was astounded, he looked so grey, so yellowish.

"Confessing?"

"With me they all own up. That's the way I do things, Comrade People's Commissar!"

"Fine. For how many countries?"

"For four, comrade People's Commissar."

Yezhov glanced at me sideways and our eyes met. I wondered whether he recognized me.

"Not enough."

The scar-faced dwarf, the Russian Marat, as he was fond of styling himself, sidled out of the room.

We all sat down.

"He's not looking very well, so yellowish, grey."

"Why, do you know him?"

I described the three kisses.

"In your toilet recently I happened to glance at my face in the mirror I now realize that life has been easier for me these past months than for him," I observed.

Solovyov looked at me from under his brows, but said nothing. In silence he finished writing and pressed the bell... ■

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FROM THE XXth CENTURY POLITICAL THOUGHT

Introduced by *New Times* analyst **Rostislav Zolotaryov**

Ivan Khristoforovich Ozerov was an outstanding Russian economist, lawyer, politician and writer (his fiction was published under the pen-name Z.Ikhorov). There is no information about Ozerov's life after the year 1922, the date of his death has not been established (our own investigations have got us nowhere). For all we can tell, the worst might have happened to him: few people whose views did not suit the powers-that-were managed to survive. It is true that the leaders called for "civil peace" and invited "bourgeois experts" to cooperate but showed no mercy to those who declined the offer). Comrade Bukharin, for instance, called for "working together," but added: "It is necessary to turn to a certain side only." He had often, but unobtrusively, reminded the "mice" (as the "experts" were often referred to) that the Bolsheviks were firmly in control and it was no use opposing them.

The economists who had not lost common sense, who hoped that the New Economic Policy would bring the economy back to normal, the scientists who had rallied around Petrograd's *Ekonomist*, Moscow's *Ekonomicheskoye Vozrozhdeniye* and other economic journals were doomed. That was true of those who stood up for a return to "capitalism" (without putting any ideological meaning into this word), and of those who upheld a socialism based on "normal," i.e. market principles.

Soviet power had no need for advisers, let alone advisers who were businesslike and competent and only set off the leaders' dilettantism. The leaders were of the opinion that no one should have any property at all, but they could well afford to be ascetic – why should they bother about chickenfeed when had the whole country in their grip...

Those who showed concern for the country, for its wealth, for the well-being of the people (and, into the bargain, used such blasphemous words as "capitalism," "profit," "capital," "turnover") were looked upon as enemies. Such people included Ivan Ozerov, the son of a poor Kostroma peasant, who had gone all the way to professorship, becoming one of the country's major authorities on financial law, budgetary policy and taxation; he was elected a member of the State Council in 1909.

Today we are introducing the reader to an abridged text of his article "On Adjusting Monetary Circulation" published in the ill-fated *Ekonomist* journal in 1922 (No.3). The article sums up the results of the first year of the New Economic Policy and shows the futility of the attempts to cross a natural economic system with an artificial one. Although some of the author's arguments are now out of date (we no longer have the golgen standard, the technological and ecological factors of the economy have changed) the article has lost none of its topical value, on the whole, as the reader will see for himself.

Money, commodity, and economic nightmare

Ivan Ozerov (1869 –?)

In a situation where the ruble is catastrophically falling and everything is going topsy-turvy everything is assuming a speculative character. Soviet power's former monetary policy would have been correct, if the purpose it served – the creation of a communist state – hab been achieved, i.e. if the conditions had been ripe for it. Unfortunately, there were no such conditions... By now we have almost abolished money (or, at least, greatly depreciated it) but failed to build up the communist system; on the contrary, a return to capitalism calls for the restoration of a healthy money circulation. When Witte decided to restore money circulation here, that called for a system of complicated measures. To begin with, he made the budget non-deficit, curtailed allocations ruthlessly, understated incomes and, in the end, obtained a budget surplus. His fiscal policy was tough but, to a certain extent, justifiably so...

Our budget will remain in the red for quite a while yet: our national economy is crumbling. We do not replace railway sleepers, do not repair railway tracks, warehouses, and so on. When destruction amounts to certain proportions, we shall have to meet all the expenses involved, after all, and this will leave a gaping hole in our budget, and we shall have nothing to stop it with. Our factory and office workers are underpaid and again, in time, when the organism gets exhausted, we shall have to raise the pay rates (emaciation causes high morbidity, reduces work efficiency, etc.). This is not only a budget deficit, but also a progressing impoverishment of the national economy. With our new budget policy of reducing deficit, *we are now forcing deficit from the budget into the national economy...*

In order to raise the ruble exchange rate, it is necessary to make the ruble work harder, i.e. to step up the intensity of economic life. That was why Witte stimulated economic activity and drew foreign capital... The appropriate export policy was established, with railway tariffs on exports reduced. Measures were taken to accumulate gold reserves, deposit receipts were introduced and, finally, the practice of settling accounts in gold was authorized. Paper money emission was cut down.

Today, paper money emission is unrestricted. There is much money, but the sphere of its application has shrunk: it is forbidden to deal in land, securities, foreign currency, houses, etc., and the very mass of commodities has reduced. So the volume of work for the paper money to do has diminished, while the amount of this money has grown enormously. Despite growing emission, the value of paper money is steadily declining. Besides that, the prices of many objects, expressed in gold, are higher than previously. This explains the paradox of a universal money shortage against the background of the banknote blizzard.

As banknote emission goes on, the volume of useful work done by the total mass of paper money put into circulation will keep decreasing; as a result, solvent demand will go further down. The links between individual economic units will break at an ever faster rate, and a total paralysis of the country's economy may ensue shortly. Goods, like blood clots in a human body, will get stuck in various arteries of the economic system, blocking them. Further emissions will never keep up with the money depreciation rate. Having drawn old resources to the market, the new economic policy made another downward zigzag in the process of money depreciation, and when these resources are used up, the line will start climbing up.

Our money is depreciating owing to inflation and to underproduction. The government ought to publish, at least once a month, statistics on the rate of its paper money emission, because secrecy always gives rise to wild rumours. Openness is the best policy under the circumstances...

An unrestricted emission of paper money can be referred to as "pessimistic depreciation". Writing about the stock exchange, Professor Petrazhitsky referred to its operation as "optimistic appreciation" (Prof. L.Petrazhitsky was a well-known lawyer, sociologist and psychologist – **Ed.**). Each "bull" is trying to raise stock prices with a view to selling his stock at a profit. The present "pessimistic depreciation" is due to the foreknowledge that our money will keep falling, and the greater this "depreciation", the longer will a certain group of persons have to wait before they money can be converted into goods. For instance, the peasants who sell bread, eggs and milk cannot always find the products they want on the market, with our trade being what it is. Therefore, they have to postpone the purchase of these products, and to allow for the depreciation of their money. As commodity resources are depleted and the goods are alienated from the prospective buyer, paper money will keep losing in value, and pessimistic depreciation will keep growing.

A nationalized industry is a parasite, a vampire which sucks the economy and the people dry

And so, in order to normalize money circulation, we have to reduce paper money emission and to put it within certain limits; nevertheless, we cannot do that now because our budget is deficit; now all want to trade, and no one wants to work. We need an active balance of trade (which we had under Witte), and now we have a passive one (we've got nothing to export). We used to export grain, eggs, barley; now we have nothing, we are still to restore our national economy, and the goods we offer abroad find no ready market, many are still shy of buying them.

We cannot get our industry off the ground now: this takes credit, but money is usually lent on security, and what kind of security can there be in the absence of private property ownership? War communism has not actually been abolished in this sphere yet, although the first steps towards its abolition have already been made. In a communist state there is no, and neither can be, properly organized and far-flung credit system: you lend money only to someone you trust. But people who do not have enough to eat, and are in great straits in general, gradually lose their honesty – in general, higher cells, the most refined ones, are the first to die in an adverse environment, and we are now syphilized by the bacilla of sloth, idleness, theft and graft.

Without credit, our industry has no stimulus to work at all, and neither do all of us. We have just come to realize the importance of private property as a stimulus to hard work. For fear of losing their property, people worked to the best of their abilities...

In the good old times, banks and savings banks served as safety valves, as kidneys filtering the organism's waste matter away; in case of a kidney trouble, the organism gets contaminated with this waste. In the same way, the destruction of banks and savings banks has resulted in the contamination of the economic organism with excessive banknotes. We no longer have these safety devices which used to accumulate ths waste matter, this loose money; the Finance Ministry could easily withdraw it from circulation by neutralizing it through floating domestic loans. Today there is no one to discharge this curative function, and our industry is paralyzed because it lacks a firm yardstick of production cost. Seeing that thins have gone terribly wrong as far as production cost is concerned, we smashed this indicator just as a wise Brahman had broken a magnifying glass upon seeing trough it a multitude of living creatures in his drinking water. Lest his conscience should torment him, he smashed that mute witness of his failure to observe vegetarian principles. The logic of our own actions was about the same.

In our case, money is not an instrument of accumulation which was correct in a communist state where it was necessary to put up barriers to the emergence of the new bourgeoisie; but we are compelled to go back to capitalism without a firm criterion of values, the result will be anything but capitalism because the latter can function properly and stimulate efficient work only given a firm criterion of values and the use of money as a handy and "portable" instrument of accumulation.

Today, money in our country is a simple means of circulation, everybody waves it away, everybody is kind of afraid of keeping it for too long. This is understandable – to keep a steadily depreciating currency makes about as much sense as to hoard melting snow. In order to adjust money circulation, we have to develop our gold mining industry, but this calls for the establishment of large combines (i.e. joint. – **Ed.**) enterprises because we cannot do anything on our own. Our old enterprises are notorious for their inefficiency, and we cannot set up new ones single-handed... Currency depreciation has already had a destructive effect on our economy, it has broken the links between economic units, weakened economic energy, while the overall conditions of our public life, paralyzed our heart, i.e. the desire to work – I mean the paralysis of private enterprise. Our gold stock has melted away because our export was out of all proportion to our import...

Before we stabilize our currency, we shall hardly draw foreign investments on an appreciable scale because on paper money can buy the investors neither land, nor apartment blocks, nor shares; consequently, the situation here is much worse than that in any capitalist country whose currency has depreciated; in such a country, you can always stabilize your paper money by converting it into real values (land, houses, shares, and the like). In our country, there is not much your paper money can buy...

True, this paper money of ours can be converted into exportable raw materials – but there are no raw materials, they are still to be produced; besides, a nationalized foreign trade (while it still exists) and a malfunctioning transport system make exporting raw materials quite a problem. There is no denying the fact that a certain amount of profit made in paper money can be re-invested but, again, the sphere of its application is very limited – and so is that of foreign capital here. Russia is not attractive to foreign capital even in this respect, not to mention other insurmountable barriers such as our labour legislation – after all, there is a long-standing demand for international labour legislation to protect labour; stubborn one-sided resistance to it is impermissible... This ought to be taken into consideration if we are to draw any capital investments from the outside.

Enterprises are taken on lease not by solid businessmen but by speculators (and even they often cancel their lease after a while) who capitalize on the understatement of the value of the leased enterprise's stock and use – or intend to use – the resultant profit

margin; all these business ventures involve a certain amount of risk, but in this crucible a new bourgeoisie with well-developed protective mechanisms (our bourgeoisie of old had no such mechanisms – it had risen in a greenhouse atmosphere which explains why it proved unable to defend its positions and abandoned them so meekly when attacked; the new bourgeoisie will be better armed to defend, under such trying circumstances, the position it has secured)...

In general, there is no room for healthy production in our atmosphere; there are enterprises depending on their profit on illegal means (such as machinations in stock-taking or purchasing fuel and raw materials on the side), and the is trade, i.e. a short-cut to profit. Even trade, however, involves a lot of trouble, and it is much more convenient to speculate in gold, diamonds, etc. This is syphilization of Russia, Russia is turning into a paradise for speculators, and the State Bank is promoting the process as best it can, i.e. to the best of its financial potential. Under the circumstances, it is no use asking for purpose-oriented industrial credit: there will always be the temptation to put the loan to other purposes, to use it for speculation – indeed, you cannot place every borrower under constant surveillance lest he should spent the loan on gold or merchandise. Commodity credit has also assumed a speculative character in the State Bank, for the most part... Productive work will be impossible in Russia until foreign capitals begin fo flow in and until we get an incentive to work; and this incentive will come when you can buy full value for your money. We are even spoiling human nature by rearing speculators of the worst, rapacious, kind instead of creative individuals... I must admit, though, that the encouragement of an audacious will to live is not a bad thing, after all...

Money has become a nominal means of circualation; as a matter of fact, it's neither metal, nor paper, just air

Until now, the budget was wholly deficit, and therefore curtailing paper money emission is out of the question. Many heavy taxes are introduced but no sources are provided to pay them from, and when the taxes will such the people's last resources dry, the people will have nothing left...

The depreciation of money will rupture the capillaries along which goods circulate, and the nutritive substances required by the national economy will long remain unusued in the form of goods which find no buyers; the depreciation of money will remove from the scene the force capable of setting it in motion and causing it to change hands, and this will put an end to labour productivity. In Russia today, some are merely going through the motions of working, others take bribes for a living, and still others speculate in all manner of commodities.

On the positive side, all this makes our apathetic character more dynamic and compels us to work; this will become a habit in the long run, and we shall have no "rentiers"...

The force of things brings us back to capitalism, and we come to see for ourselves that while people remain what they are, the national economy resembles the common toy known as the tilting doll – no matter how often you tilt it, it will always resume its uright position...

Let us face it: paper money keeps depreciating and there may come a time when it will no longer be able to serve even as a means of circulation. Therefore, resolute measures should be taken to raise its value and to curtail its emission.

Besides all that, disorders of the monetary system often encourage speculative tendencies in this country, distract people from production; consequently, we have to create, without delay, a fixed criterion of value which – it being impossible to stabilize our paper money circulation – can be done only by legalizing gold, silver and foreign currency (dollars, pounds, francs, etc.) as instruments of settling business accounts – otherwise, they will "flee" Russia like the unemployed; if they get a job here, they will stay and keep accumlating, which will give the Russian people an incentive to work. It is necessary to allow depositing gold, silver and the like, with interest on them to be pais in the saame values. This will draw gold and silver coins out of money-boxes and, to a certain extent, liven up mony circulation. It is necessary to allow export by private individuals as a means of drawing gold and silver coins and foreign currency from abroad. This ought to be done without delay, otherwise too much gold will flow out of the country...

The present system of the national economy is a mongrel that combines elements of communist and capitalist societies which are the least conducive to productive work, such as the abolition of private property ownership, the nationalization of enterprises which deprives workers of the basic stimulus to hard work – personal interest...

We have adopted the worst element of the capitalist system – a faulty monetary system which imparts a speculative character to our entire activity; as a result, our national economy is now in a state of precarious balance, it is like a truncated cone standing on its sharp edge and swinging now to the right, now to the left. Now we are apparently tending to the right; therefore, we should resolutely adopt all the elements of the capitalist system including private property ownership which will give people stimulus to fruitful work.

Our economic system being a mongrel, we cannot put our budget right at present. Our deficit budget is devoured by the nationalization of the industry, this expensive parasite, this vampire...

The vampire has emptied the people's pockets, so the people cannot even afford paying taxes; as a result, the sphere of taxation has been narrowed down (I mean taxation which the taxpayer can bear), and shops (bakeries, etc.) close down one after another.

We must regain trust in ourselves both inside the country and abroad, to get our government recognized abroad, and then, perhaps, we shall receive a loan abroad guaranteed by our natural wealth, which will help us stabilize our ruble's exchange rate; this will enable us to float domestic loans as a means of withdrawing surplus paper money from circulation.

Further, we must give back to the people the incentives to work they are accustomed to, and create conditions for a thrifty management of our economy. We must rid our budget of the vampires which suck its blood. We must put taxation within proper limits lest it should impair our emergent trade and industry... Taxation should conform to the taxpayer's income. Any other policy is shortsighted and ruinous for the country...

Dmitry Krylov, the regular host of the "Telescope" TV show, describes his programme as "the mildest from the political point of view." As for Dmitri, he also seems to be a very mild and intelligent person. Nevertheless, his attitude to the corrent situation at the Central Television is rather negative. Krylov believes that the state of things is hopeless, TV programmes are closing for political reasons, the best journalists are leaving and are replaced by people without any personality — "it's a feast of unprofessionalism and dilettantism." At the same time, Leonid Kravchenko, Chief of TV repeats practically "in every interview that his credo is professionalism and decency". Incidentally, he has counted that the number of interviews with him and articles published about him has surpassed three hundred.

"Kravchenko has got out of control," Dmitry tells the newsmen. "If you will excuse such an analogy, he reminds me of a criminal who has murdered several people and will be hanged anyway, so he doesn't care any more and won't stop short of anything."

Krylov says that at present there remain only four "opposition" TV programmes "Before and After Midnight" (every time its authors think that it is their last show) and the programmes "ATV" (Author's Television) — "Press-Club", "Of Late" (a review of the latest events) and "Telescope". But soon the host of "Telescope" will have to leave too, since all more or less critical items are taken out and the programme is expected to be soon closed all together.

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Journalist **Kitty Kelly,** America's premier slash biographer, has published a book about the former First Lady Nancy Reagan. The book which became a bestseller overnight raises numerous questions. Is Nancy Reagan really such a bitch as Kelly describes her? Or is it just another example of disgusting, dirty journalism?

On the 600 pages of the book Kelly ruthlessly vivisects the former First Lady — and gets away with it, mostly because many Americans disliked Nancy Reagan. And so: Nancy was an indifferent and heartless mother, she manipulated people for the sake of her career and later — for the sake of her husband's career. When in Hollywood she slept with the necessary people to get a new role. In Washington she became another Marie-Antoinette, a real force behind the back of the teflon president. She spied on her own children and — what is especially horrible — lied about her age. Last but not least, when Reagan was the governor of California, Nancy had an affair with Frank Sinatra. The affair continued in the White House too, which added zest to it.



As for the president, Kitty Kelly discovered a very ambiguous incident in his biography. She claims that young Ronald used force when he was left alone with a good-looking actress in her Hollywood apartment.

Kelly says that while writing the book she used interviews with a thousand odd people who knew the couple from different sides. However, already now people accuse her of numerous mistakes. Nancy's former secretary found 20 distortions in the paragraphs devoted to her. Apart from that, Kelly is accused of violating the journalistic ethics: the reporters she employed often concealed whom they represented, and received the information

Ensurance for a Communist

The Co-chairmen of the Austrian Communist Party, 48-year old journalist **Susanne Sohn** and 39-year-old **Walter Silbermeir** have "hoisted a white flag". They announced their decision to resign their commission of the Co-chairmen of the Austrian Communist Party and leave the Party ranks, where they had stayed for some twenty years. Another 18 members of the Central Committee — that's one third of the Committee have followed their example and left the Communist Party.

When in January 1990 Sohn and Silbermeir became the Party's co-chairmen they were full of hope and optimism. It seemed that the young and energetic politicians would manage to take the Party out of the extreme crisis. The duet replaced the veteran of the Communist movement Franz Muri, who had headed the Austrian Communists for a quarter of a century but had not achieved any success. When he led the Party it won less than one percent of votes at parliamentary elections.

The new party leaders began to work very actively, starting with restructuring the backward party structures. And it was here that they suffered a fiasco. Their attempts to renew the Party's activity and conduct an active dialogue with all the left-wing forces brought no results. Sohn and Silbermeir blame this on the united and well-organized resistance on the part of the Party machine, in which the main role is played by the fundamentalists. The latter will not give up the line started in the age of the flourishing "real socialism" for love or money. In fact they managed to block all the new initiatives and a broad inter-party discussion of ways and methods of overcoming the crisis. The former leaders of the Austrian Communist Party believe that the Party functionaries are now busy fighting for power, money and influence, something that Susanne and Walter are not willing to do.

The former leaders do not regard their leaving of the Party as the end of their political career. They are planning to form a new movement of "left-wing democratic forces". The movement will be open to Communists too. The two say that they are not going to give up Marxism.

Although they left the Party Sohn and Silbermeir are not left without a penny. According to the decisions adopted during their rule, the retired employees of the central party apparatus receive a considerable discharge pay. In Silbermeir's case it makes up 1.3 million shillings.

Anatoly Kovrigin, our own correspondent
VIENNA

which Kelly would've never been granted.

So, was Nancy really such a bitch or wasn't she? Or are those who call Kitty Kelly names right?

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Seventy-five-year old Frenchman of Russian origin **George Krassovsky,** a peace activist, has chosen a rather unusual way of preventing war — a cycle-race. In the summer of 1990 Krassovsky and eight Soviet citizens undertook a cycle-race from Moscow to Paris. Their peace action was a great success and the participants in the race were received by the French President Francois Mitterrand. This year's Peace race will pass through the "hot spots" of the Caucasus and the Middle East: Baku, Tbilisi and Yerevan, and from there via Beirut, Damascus, Amman, Jerusalem, Tel-Aviv and Cairo — to Alexandria. This time Krassovsky will be accompanied by eight people aged from 60 to 80. They plan to cover the whole route without any support group or help. In every city that they will visit the men will hold one and the same ceremony — 15 minutes of silence to commemorate the victims of all the wars. With their action the veretan-enthusiasts want to draw public attention to that conflict-prone region and help people realize that all conflicts should be solved peacefully.

George Krassovsky is a journalist and the editor-in-chief of the magazine *Le nouvel Humanisme* published in France. It is written in his passport that he has no citizenship.

"I couldn't find a better way of demonstrating people's diplomacy," he says. "All we can do with my friends, is mount our bikes and ride 'over mountains and dales' from the Caspian Sea to the Egyptian pyramids hoping to make a contribution to the establishment of a new and more humane international order.

K.Shakhnov

A British woman **Sara Dale** describes herself as a healing therapist, claiming to be something like an Oriental "healer", but ill-wishers say that she is a professional prostitute. But she specializes on treating patients with sado-masochistic disturbances. Therapist Dale denies the accusations, but admits that her techniques sometimes require that she dress in rubber or use whips on her clients.

She charges 100 dollars an hour, which she finds quite enough to be comfortably off and pay for the house that she rents in London. However, when the first article about the sado-masochistic sessions in the basement appeared in the press, her landlord decided to evict the tenant who rents his million-dollar home. He is doing it for career rather than financial reasons. The fact is that the landlord is the British Chancellor of the Exchequer Norman Lamont. He does not like the idea of filling his personal "exchequer" with money earned by Sara with the help of a whip. As any other finance minister Lamont, is likely to understand sadism. But masochism is alien to him.

Another defender

"There is not a place in this country where life and journalistics have not thrown him to," these promising words begin the article headed *The main thing is the Men* about **Pavel Gutiontov** carried in the students' newspaper of the journalistics department of Moscow University. The hero of the article worked in *Komsomolskaya Pravda* and according to the article's author "visited the Kushka cape, flew on all types of planes and helicopters, jumped with a parachute into the Sea of Vilyuy and crossed the Kamakumels set on foot. "At least he does not say that I was the first to set foot on the dark side of the Moon", that's how Gutiontov commented on these inspired lines.

In April 1991, Pavel Gutiontov received a responsible post. The Congress of the Journalists' Union of the USSR appointed him Chairman of the Committee for the Defence of the Freedom of Speech and the Rights of Journalists. So Gutiontov will have to abandon the hard life of a journalist, lay the pen aside and put on the administrative yoke. It's hard to imagine him in this role. He became famous due to his newspaper articles. He writes very vividly, works a lot, and a great deal of his articles appear in the press. At first he worked with the *Moskovsky Komsomolets* newspaper, where he began his career under Yury Shchekochikhin, then he moved to *Komsomolskaya Pravda* and from there — to *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, and the past four years he has spent at *Izvestiya*, where he became the leading observer on internal policy issues.

And now this honorable but difficult post. The first place Gutiontov plans to visit is the TV tower in Vilnyus. The Committee he heads plans to conduct a most serious investigation of the January story. After that Gutiontov plans to visit Milan, where he wants to exchange opinions with his Italian collegues on the rights and liberties of journalists. Next on the list is Georgia, where, as it is known, the new authorities have done away with the fredom of the press as it is. The Committee plans to solve the complex problem in the *Izvestiya* paper, where the staff are strongly opposing the Editor-in-Chief N.Yefimov.

So Pavel Gutiontov will have to display the principle and tough sides of his nature. But as the author of the abovementioned article puts it, "difficulties are only making him tougher".

Orwell's come back

or Operation Gutenberg

Larisa Lisyutkina

Ancient philosophers believed books like people had destinies. Sometimes, it turns out that a book's father is an altogether different person than that whose name is on the cover. Like people, books can die early or live long lives. Books can be young, mature and aged. Sometimes, books have to go underground. There are Cinderellas among books who later become happy princesses, and there are less happier books too.

I have an acquaintance of book whose life is indeed remarkable. That book's author is the British writer, George Orwell. In 1949 he published a novel under the title *1984*.

The novel had no chances in the USSR. Reading or simply keeping a copy of *1984*, even in the English language which few people speak here, was a crime against the state.

At the beginning of the 1980s, the world was getting ready to celebrate an unusual anniversary: neither an anniversary of a book's publishing, nor a jubilee of its author, but a fictitious historical date specified on the cover: *1984*.

The Soviet Union reacted as well. The Progress Publishers turned out a restricted, "special purpose" circulation of *1984* intended for a privileged readership having access to books that were not to be read by the broad public. The book sent out to several hundred top nomenklatura officials whom Orwell called "members of the inner party." Life was very similar to fiction. In any case, Orwell's book became a hero of the story described in this literary work itself.

At the same time with the secret publishing of Orwell's novel, workers of the USSR Academy of Sciences who specialized in the affairs of Western Europe and North America were instructed by the Party bosses to study and analyse what the Western media said about the upcoming celebration and how they slandered us.

My friend and I were assigned to the job: her responsibility was the Anglo-Saxon countries, and mine was Germany.

We read through foreign periodicals in large libraries which had special depositories for books and magazines which were not to be read by the common people. However, besides the "top-secret" magazines, we also needed the book itself. We asked a lot of friends whether any of them had a copy of *1984* smuggled in from the West. Nobody had, but instead emigre publications, we finally got a copy of that small-circulation Progress edition, brazenly stolen from one big boss by one of our friends who visited him shortly before she turned up at our flat.

We were beside ourselves with joy. But the joy was not to last long. A couple of days later my colleague lost the book at a meat shop, where at those times people could still buy meat.

The only thing left for us was to wait and to try to guess who will be arrested first: my colleague, myself, or the woman-friend who gave us the book, or her high-ranking bureaucrat of a friend, who had received a numbered copy of *1984*.

Those were horrible days. Every day we feared exposure and arrest – just like in the years of the Great Terror.

Meanwhile we were through with the Western media review and handed it over to our boss. The review was soon published in a special journal appearing under the sign "for restricted use only" on the cover. My unfortunate friend and I were even given a bonus for the job we had done. The bonus only aggravated our fear of punishment.

At last, we could not stand it any more and told everything to the woman-friend who had stolen the book for us. After that sleepless nights started for her as well.

She was no stronger and finally told the whole story to her husband, a jolly young avant-garde painter whose jokes deserve to be described in a separate volume.

For example, one of his hobbies was as such: he would draw a fake commuter ticket for himself every months that allowed him to travel for free across Moscow. "I only want to play a fair game with the state," he said. Later, when travel restrictions were eased, he tried to draw the German entry visa stamp in his passport. However, a holographic sign in the German stamp defeated him. Baffled by the German scrupulousness, he sighed: "The Germans are a difficult people. You can't even pull a joke on them" – and joined the weeks-long line outside the German embassy's consular department.

Drawing by Victor Bogorad

The underground avant-garde painter swore at us and the mildest of the words he used was "sluts." We did not dare object, but only intoned miserably: "What do we do now?"

Our secret was spreading like a drop of ink on a linen table cloth. A couple of days later we convened a strategy-planning meeting attended by a dozen of people initiated in the secret. We planned Op-

eration Gutenberg, that boiled down to repeating the exploit of the world's first book printer.

We needed one more book from the secret Progress series, just like the one we had lost. Then we planned to copy it on a secret Xerox machine installed in the KGB and serviced by the girl-friend of a friend, a jobless actor. Then, friends associated with Samizdat would help us to bind the copy, to make the front page with the personal number of the big boss and after that the fake book was to resume its place on the big boss' bookshelf.

For about a week we were busy looking for the original for our fake. One evening, the company of ten conspirators assembled around our kitchen table, looking at the modest white book which looked home-made to us. All night long we read Orwell's fantasy that had become a reality in this country.

Early in the morning, the actor put the book under his jacket and headed for the KGB headquarters.

After 6 p.m. of the same day the white sheets of Orwell's novel, lovingly xeroxed by the KGB, were already placed on that same kitchen table. The KGB girl-friend, 20, of a jobless actor, saw our fear and tried to calm us: "Everything's gonna be OK. People only think that the KGB has everybody on the hook. In reality, though, the KGB makes blunders here and there. Look at me: I have been xeroxing this for you and reading this for the whole day, but they did not notice anything."

To make the cover, we found the glossy paper used in the Progress original. While helping us, the Samizdat people must have produced lots of copies for themselves using their own resources. Thus Orwell became everybody's reading.

It was practically impossible to tell the fake from the real thing. Our avant-garde painter had proved his worth.

A little over a year after those events, first amnestied books were transferred from special depositories to general reading halls. The hexagonal stamps with secret registry numbers were erased from them.

One more year later, that same Progress Publishers turned out Orwell's novel in mass circulation and *1984* started to be sold everywhere.

We do not know what happened to the book we had manufactured. Was it ever read by anyone?

It's a pity that they don't give Gutenberg Awards for best home-made books. Our chances to receive it would be enviable.

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From a basement to the Central Exhibition Hall

Painting emerges from underground

Anatoly Gorelov,
D.Sc.(Philosophy)

The festive – and mysterious – atmosphere in Malaya Lubianka street, "next door" to formidable citadel of the State Security Committee. A dishevelled and untidy artist turns over one canvas after another, watching your reaction to his pictures so strikingly unlike anything you can see in galleries and at formal exhibitions. Could I imagine then, at Vasily Sitnikov's apartment in Malaya Lubianka, that I'd see works of the same kind in the country's Central Exhibition Hall a quarter of a century later?

After Khrushchev's "pogrom" in the Hall, the press branded abstractionism, surrealism and other fashionable "isms" as decadent bourgeois art while paled beside the works by Laktionov and other numerous adherents to the solely correct art form – socialist realism. The echoes of the discussion reached formal exhibitions held in time for national holidays, and I often witnessed spontaneous disputes there over whether an artist could depict the world as he, not everybody else, saw it.

In the meantime, new art was born in the basements nearby and sought to come up to the surface. Exhibitions were arranged in private flats and I remember being warned against going to see them ("The gumshoes will spot you there, and you'll be marked down as a suspect"). An unauthorized art show on a tract of wasteland was bulldozed. Later the artists rejected by the Academy and by the authorities were mercifully permitted to unite into a trade union which had a tiny office at 28, Malaya Gruzinskaya street, and to arrange their exhibitions in cubby-holes cramped for space and communicating with one another by means of narrow corridors.

What followed was a contrast between huge but empty formal exhibition halls and an endless queue at 28, Malaya Gruzinskaya, with people lining up so close alongside one another that it was impossible for anyone to squeeze in. On the one hand, plenty of room; on the other, not an inch of room. That went on for two decades, with just one break when a modern art exhibition suddenly opened at the Beekeeping Pavilion of the USSR Exhibition of Economic Achievements. I remember it because it was the only one.

Formal socialist realism and the alternative school of painting were poles apart. "Socialist realists" had commissions, studios and country villas. Underground artists lived in basements, did not have to eat enough, and the press had nothing but abuse for them. Many of them never lived to hear a word of official praise. Some got sick and tired – and left the country for good. This is not to say that all the members of the Artists' Union lived without a care in the world. The absence of a normal creative atmosphere, of healthy rivalry, told on them, too. Their ideas often failed to materialize, and they drank themselves to death as quickly as the underground artists did.

At last, they have emerged from underground, and the atmosphere at the exhibition opened in the Central Hall on April 22 – which summed up, as it were, the results of the 20-year work of the independent artists' union – differed sharply (while being somewhat reminiscent of) that in the basements of 25 years ago. It was marked by excitement – the excitement of merriment rather than of fear. The mystery remained, but that was the mystery of art, not the secretiveness of a law-breaker. What was once persecuted now opened itself up for all to see.

Not all the "off-beat" artists were represented there. Some did not come over from abroad, some did not live to see the happy day (Anatoly Zverev, Vladimir Kazmin and others). But painting prevailed, if that is a consolation to us.

The exhibition represents all genres of graphic art from still-lifes to icons, from abstracts to primitives. True, there is no traditional sculpture of Lenin looking ahead and beckoning us to the radiant future; instead, the visitors are greeted at entrance by posters of political satire and by St. Christopher who bears a slight resemblance to Grachev. You will also see our Prime Minister lunching on a wad of banknotes. With this and a few other exceptions, the exhibition is strictly no-politics.

It is a triumph of art, not politics, a breath-taking panorame of art trends, and as you take it in you suddenly come to realize that all the disputes and mutual criticisms have been in vain, that all artists mirror reality, each in his own way and to the extent of his talent – be it the reality of life or the reality of his own soul. It is exactly talent, not the content of a work, that determines its (and its creator's) value. The absurdity of our stagnant reality, not apparent to many, was mirrored by keenly observant artists in their paintings. However, best of these paintings breathed an irrepressible craving for light and happiness.

Painting has emerged from underground. Now it's fiction's turn (fiction is also coming to light little by little, but you cannot see all of it at once, like you do paintings here in the exhibition hall), and so is architecture (hopefully, our avant-garde architects' futuristic designs will be translated into reality some time). Soviet culture is emerging from underground. Congratulations!

Come over to the exhibition before it goes on a tour of the United States, and share the artists' joy over the freedom of self-expression!

■

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